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ABSTRACT 
This thesis applies the principles of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace to a study 
of the historical relations between Greece and Turkey. According to Kant, three principal 
elements – democracy; economic interdependence; and international organizations and 
international law – interact to promote peaceful relations among states. This thesis 
analyzes these three elements in respect to the relationship between Greece and Turkey 
throughout history. 
The thesis concludes that Kant’s three elements have been influential in Greek-
Turkish relations. Historically, the two states’ interdependence has, in general, had a 
positive effect. But it is the conjunction of the three elements as evidenced mostly 
through the European Union that suggests the most peaceful future for the two states. 
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This thesis examines Greece and Turkey’s bi-lateral diplomatic and strategic 
relationship within the context of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s 1795 
treatise, Perpetual Peace. Kant argues that the basis of international peace consists of 
three elements: republican constitutions; “cosmopolitan law,” embodied in free trade and 
economic interdependence; and international law and organizations. While each of the 
three elements may individually promote peace, when they are developed together, the 
resulting interaction raises the probability of peaceful relations among states. 
Kant’s theory of democratic peace suggests that democracies rarely fight one 
another and are reluctant to use the threat of force against one another. Democratic 
leaders are thus more constrained in the use of violence than non-democratic ones.1 
Today’s liberal democratic states are capitalistic promoting trade and the free market. As 
a consequence, the development of economic relations between states has a positive 
effect on their foreign policies. Violent statecraft is less probable because it is less cost 
effective. As a state’s economic interdependence becomes deeper, the need for 
international organizations or regimes to regulate the relations of such nation-states 
becomes more beneficial. The more such organizations and regimes are developed and 
the more states rely on them for their specific interests, the more pacific their influence. 
To comply with the norms of these institutions, states are more likely to try and find a 
cooperative solution to their disputes. 
For more than fifty years, Greece and Turkey have had a turbulent relationship. 
The tension between them, which some describe as a mini–Cold War, began in its most 
modern form with the emergence of the Cyprus problem in the mid-1950s, while the 
island was still under British rule. Since then, the confrontation between them has 
occasionally come very close to war. At ten year intervals there has been some event that  
 
                                                 
1 Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 40. 
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might have initiated violence. Thus, traditionally, the policies the two states followed 
were policies of confrontation, since from the perspective of the states’ decision makers, 
a zero-sum mindset dominated their approach to bi-lateral relations.  
Since the beginning of this century and the rise of the European Union as a 
powerful political force, however, these tense relations have entered a new phase and the 
likelihood of confrontation became more remote. As early as 1999, Greece evidenced a 
new policy toward Turkey when it not only ceased its blockage of Turkey’s European 
Union candidacy, but also actually promoted it. This policy, combined with the two 
countries’ mutual public expressions of sympathy for the victims of two disastrous 
earthquakes that affected both of them, initiated an era of détente.  
But this rapprochement has not resolved their main issues of dispute. Long-
standing issues still on the table include: Greece’s intention to extend its territorial waters 
from six to twelve miles, which Turkey declared a casus belli in 1995; the Cyprus 
problem; and Turkey’s claims regarding the status of the Aegean Sea and the orientation 
of the Continental Shelf.2 More recently, minority rights also have been added to the 
dispute agenda. In play is also the strategic effect of the Iraq war and the singularization 
of Turkey between the hammer of NATO and the West and the anvil of regional chaos to 
the south east.  
Given these circumstances, this thesis answers one main question: How well do 
Greek-Turkish relations fit the theory of Kantian Peace? A number of contingent 
questions also are addressed. How does democracy influence the two states’ bilateral 
relations? What are the economic relations between the two countries and how do these 
affect their politics? How and to what extent have international organizations and regimes 
been influential in the policies developed by the two states? How has the lack of 
participation in some international organizations and regimes affected them? What are 
the future prospects, in relation to the development of the three Kantian elements, of 
Greece and Turkey’s bilateral relations? And, finally, is there one element more 
significant than the others and, if so, at what level? 
                                                 
2 Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Web site: 
http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/, (accessed April 17, 2007). 
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The two-hundred-year-old ideas that this thesis adapts and uses to evaluate 
current policies are of significant interest in today’s world. The achievement of peace and 
stability is often the main goal of societies. For many years, the realist theory of the 
inevitability of war dominated Greek-Turkish relations. The two governments’ 
skepticism about the intentions of the other side prevented them from visualizing a better 
future through different policies. Thus, the tension between them was maintained.  
Now, however, it is important to examine how the Kantian theory of peace works, 
because the rapprochement of the two states seems to be based on those basic ideas. The 
analysis presented here will show the reasons for the relaxation of tension between 
Greece and Turkey and will explain the existing unresolved problems. In this way, the 
thesis contributes to the general understanding of the initiatives policy-makers of the two 
countries should adopt to promote peaceful settlements. The emergence of a truly 
Kantian peace between Greece and Turkey could be a paradigm for other states with 
similar bilateral disputes in the broader area of South-East Europe, Central Asia, and the 
Middle East. 
The first chapter describes how prominent liberal scholars explain the three 
elements that comprise the Kantian peace. It also describes the major realist opposition to 
liberal theory and the most recent theories about the influence of the elements of the 
Kantian peace in international relations. 
Chapter II is a short analysis of Greek-Turkish disputes. It describes the historical 
reasons of the conflict, which are closely related to the development of each state’s 
nationalism. It also describes the current issues in dispute 
In Chapter III presents an analysis of the influence of the three elements of Kant’s 
theory in Greek-Turkish relations. It first describes the development of each state’s 
political system influenced the course of the countries’ bilateral relations. It then 
describes the economic development of each state and their bilateral economic relations. 
Finally is presented the effect that specific predominant international organizations have 
in Greek-Turkish relations. 
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In the final chapter, the thesis concludes by a reassessment of the material at hand 
and some tentative conclusions as concerns the subjects of theory as well as policy in a 
region of Europe and its glacis that longs for peace and prosperity on an enduring basis. 
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II. KANTIAN PEACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the ideal of peace as a guide to statecraft.  The question of 
war and peace in the Aegean forms a leading theme of a history that is replete with 
human suffering.  The presence of the past in Europe is universal, yet this fact cannot 
determine the fate of nations in the present and future, where the virtues of peace surely 
eclipse the appeal of power and conflict. The issue that has determined man’s evolution 
has been political and armed conflict. Thus, the majority of history books seem often to 
focus more on human conflicts than on human achievement of peace.  
Political science tries to explain human behavior and the reasons that lead 
political entities to war. For many years, it is war, not peace, that has been its main topic. 
Relatively recently, a shift occurred and peace studies began to emerge. One of the most 
influential and earliest studies of this type is Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace.3 
According to Kant, if three elements – “republican constitutions,” “cosmopolitan law” 
embodied in free trade and economic interdependence, and international law and 
organizations – are developed adequately on a global scale, peace among nations will be 
eternal.4 
This chapter explores these three elements according to Kantian liberal theory. 
The chapter also presents realist theorists’ arguments opposing Kant’s theory and 
describes the development of more recent influential theories about the role of those three 
elements in international relations.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay” (1795), in Kant’s Principles of Politics, 
W. Hastie, ed. & trans., Edimburg: T&T Clark, 1891, The Online Library of Liberty, 5, 
http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Kant_0056.pdf, (accessed February 20, 2007). 
4 Bruce Russett, and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, 29.  
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B  DEMOCRATIC PEACE 
Democracy as a system of government first emerged twenty-five centuries ago in 
ancient Greece. But this system is not directly related to the form of government referred 
to as democracy today. The ancient Greek notion of democracy arose through a 
philosophical discourse, which has been mostly forgotten over the course of history. The 
emergence of the contemporary notion of a democratic system derived from the evolution 
of the modern state and the nation-state in the period from the 13th until 18th centuries. 
The gradual transformation of the medieval feudal system to a more centralized form of 
government strengthened the authority of the king at the expense of the feudal estates.  
In England, the nobility, the church, and the mayor of London opposed the 
English king’s oppressive use of his authority, and eventually, the great land barons 
devised the Magna Charta Libertatum. The famous Magna Carta is a charter of liberties 
to which the English barons forced King John to give his assent on June 15, 1215, at 
Runnymede. The document constitutes a fundamental guarantee of rights and privileges. 
Although, it had little important historical significance at the time, the form in which it 
was adopted was revolutionary.5 It restricted the authority of the king and initiated an era 
of parliamentarian governance in Europe. Through time, the English gained privileges 
from Magna Charta that Hagen Schulze summarized under five headings: freedom of the 
press, the Habeas Corpus Act, public tribunals, jury trials, and parliamentary 
representation.6 
Other European states created their own parliamentarian systems on the basis of 
the medieval estates. Such formed the basis for the break through of the estates generaux 
in the French Revolution. Nonetheless, democracy remained limited to Western Europe 
and its evolution gradual until the 20th century. Indeed, democracy did not achieve its 
contemporary form until the second half of the twentieth century. As described by Robert 
Dahl and Bruce Stinebrickner, its basic characteristics comprise seven essential 
institutions of polyarchic or democratic systems.  
                                                 
5 Hagen Schulze, trans., Yuill E. William, States, Nations, and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to 
the Present, Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2002, 22–23. 
6 Ibid., 76. The Habeas Corpus Act prevents arbitrary arrests. 
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1. Control over final decisions about government policy is vested in elected 
officials. 
2. Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in frequent, fair, and 
free elections in which force and coercion are absent or quite limited. 
3. Virtually all adults have the right to vote. 
4. Most adults also have the right to run for public offices in these elections. 
5. Citizens possess a right, effectively enforced by government officials, to 
freedom of expression, including criticism of and opposition to the leaders 
or party holding top government offices. 
6. They have access, and an effectively enforced right to gain access, to 
sources of information that are not monopolized by the government of the 
state, or by any other single group. 
7. They possess an effectively enforced right to form and join political 
organizations, including political parties and interest groups.7 
These seven essential institutions of a democratic state have as a parallel outcome: 
the development of additional rights and freedoms within society. These freedoms and 
rights include the freedom of religion, judicial procedures that prevents easily conviction 
of criminal suspects, and the right to privacy. Although these characteristics are not 
necessary for a governmental system to be characterized as polyarchic or democratic, 
they are seldom absent from this type of government.8 
These rights are neither promoted nor protected in the same way in an 
authoritarian political system. In a non-polyarchic system, the existence of autonomous 
groups that have the ability to influence the government also is limited. As a 
consequence, policy-making by non-pluralistic governments relies mostly on senior 
members of the government , whereas in pluralistic systems, it relies on bargaining and 
negotiations. What essentially distinguishes democracies from non-democracies is the 
reliance of the former on persuasion and the latter on coercion.9  
 
                                                 
7 Robert Dahl, and Bruce Stinebrickner, Modern Political Analysis, 6th ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 2003, 79–80. 
8 Ibid., 84–85. 
9 Ibid. 
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1. The Role of Democracy in Kant’s Perpetual Peace 
Although Kant is considered one of the major theorists of liberalism, he also 
accepts the basic elements of realism. In his analysis of how “perpetual peace” may be 
achieved he accepts states as major actors. Kant finds that “A state of Peace among men 
who live side by side with each other is not the natural state. The state of Nature is rather 
a state of War.”10  Yet, his contribution to liberal theory begins from this point, because 
he proposes, contrary to realists that such peace is feasible. 
In “The First Definitive Article in the Conditions of Perpetual Peace” Kant 
supports the pacific role of a so called Republican Constitution.11 He argues that citizens 
in a republican state are more reluctant to accept war actions than is the ruler in a non-
republican state. In their case, this policy implies serious consequences: “to have to fight 
in their own persons; to supply the costs of the war out of their own property; to have 
sorrowfully to repair the devastation which it leaves behind; and, as a crowning evil, to 
have to take upon themselves at the end a burden of debt which will go on embittering 
peace itself, and which it will be impossible ever to pay off on account of the constant 
threatening of further impending wars.”12 This reluctance to go to war on the part of the 
citizens of a republic represents a fundamental premise of liberal theory about the 
bottom-up view of politics where decision-making has to take into account societal 
demands.13 
According to Kant, the term “republic” means a separation of powers between the 
judicial and the legislation branches of a state. In this system, the “political society has 
solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order.”14 A 
                                                 
10 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay” (1795), in Kant’s Principles of Politics, 
W. Hastie, ed. & trans., Edimburg: T&T Clark, 1891, The Online Library of Liberty, 5, 
http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Kant_0056.pdf (accessed February 20, 2007). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Andrew Moravcsick, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51: 4 (Autumn 1977): 516–517. 
14 Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” The American Political Science Review 80:4 
(December 1986): 1157. 
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republican governance system makes states more skeptical in waging wars. And 
gradually, through the creation of a federation of same-minded states and the continuous 
broadening of the federation until the inclusion of the last state, they will establish the 
“perpetual peace.”15 
The theory that Kant expressed became broadly known during the twentieth 
century by the well-known term “Democratic Peace.” Empirical studies show that 
democratic states rarely fight one another. This does not mean that democracies never 
fight. Democracies fight, but they will most probably fight with non-democracies. 
Furthermore, they have a tendency to ally together as they did during WWII. 
Bruce Russet provides two models that explain about the behavior of states 
according to their political system: the Cultural/Normative Model and the 
Structural/Institutional Model.16  
a. The Cultural/Normative Model 
Decision makers have a tendency to act under the norms that have been 
developed in relation with other states that are related to their domestic politics. They 
also expect the same behavior from the decision makers in other states. 
According to this model, violence between democratic states will be rare 
because compromise and nonviolence are at the root of decision makers’ domestic 
policies and should be reflected in their diplomacy. The rights and existence of a state are 
respected; democracies act under the norm of peaceful resolution and expect other 
democracies to follow the same policy. This behavior is stronger when the democratic 
system is stable and established. If one of the members of a dyad of democratic states is 
unstable, the possibility of conflict increases. 
 
                                                 
15 Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” The American Political Science Review, 1158. 
16 Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post–Cold War World, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, 35, 40. 
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Violence between non-democracies or between democracies and non-
democracies is more frequent because, in non-democracies, the use of violence is part of 
the domestic political behavior of decision makers. As a consequence, the threat and use 
of violence are expected to be common in international relations. Furthermore, 
democracies may act violently to avoid exploitation of their norms by non-democracies. 
b. The Structural/Institutional Model 
According to this model, violence between democratic states will be rare 
because, in democratic states, policy making is based on compromise among political 
actors. Public opinion must support the decision to engage in hostilities. This procedure 
prevents rash action by the policy makers and makes the decision for conflict resolution 
less likely. Since the existence of the same behavior by the policy makers of the opposing 
democratic state is expected, the fear of a surprise attack is absent. 
Violence between non-democracies or between democracies and non-
democracies is more frequent because, in non-democracies, the policy makers are less 
constrained by domestic factors. According to Bruce Russett, they “can more easily, 
rapidly, and secretly initiate large-scale violence.”17 This possibility of surprise attack 
leads policy makers of opposing democratic or non-democratic states  to use violence to 
eliminate the possibility of falling victim to a surprise attack. Furthermore, the efforts by 
the leaders of non- democracies to gain more concessions from democratic states by 
exploiting the constraints faced by democracies can lead democracies to act violently. 
2. Realist View 
Realists argue that “democratic peace” is not a theory. Kenneth Waltz, for 
instance, refers to it as a “thesis.”18 The libertarian Christopher Layne explains that it is 
just a “proposition or a hypothesis,” because “the causal relationship between the  
 
                                                 
17 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 40. 
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25:1 (Summer 
2000): 6. 
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independent variable,” which is the “democratic political structures at the unit level,” and 
the independent variable, which is “the asserted absence of war between democratic 
states,” is not adequately explained.19 
Realist assumptions about international politics, according to Hans Morgenthau, 
are based on the notion that the “world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, 
is the result of forces inherent in human nature.” It is a “world of opposing interests and 
of conflict among them,” where “moral principles can never be fully realized, but must at 
best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever 
precarious settlement of conflicts.” Thus it “aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather 
than of the absolute good.”20 
Waltz argues that realism suggests that, “If there is a distinctively political theory 
of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it.”21 According to that theory, the 
anarchical world system of states is actually a self-help system in which “those who do 
not help themselves, or who do less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay 
themselves open to dangers, will suffer.”22 There is competition and conflict among 
states that is not affected by domestic structures. In international politics, the option for a 
loser to accept an unwilling outcome does not exists as it does in national politics. Defeat 
in international competition may lead from “constraints on autonomy to occupation to 
extinction.”23 
Those using these assumptions consider democratic peace theory as flawed. 
Realists provide their own explanation for the lack of war among democratic states over 
the last two centuries. Layne finds, for example, that the number of democracies between 
1815 and 1945 was very small, and because war is rare, it did not happen for democracies 
                                                 
19 Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” International Security 19:2 
(Autumn 1994): 5, n.1. 
20 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, revised by 
Kenneth W. Tompson, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993, 3–4.  
21 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979, 117. 
22 Ibid., 118. 
23 Layne, “Kant or Cant,” 11. 
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to fight each other.24 By contrast, John Mearsheimer writes that in the post–WWII era,  
peace in Europe was the result of “the bipolarity of the distribution of power on the 
Continent, the rough equality in military power between those two polar states, and the 
appearance of nuclear weapons.”25  
Realist criticism of democratic peace theory focuses on the notion that there is no 
guarantee of moral behavior on the part of Kant’s democracies, especially to intervene in 
the affairs of other states which Kant had rejected. Thus, Waltz concludes: “If the world 
is now safe for democracy, one has to wonder whether democracy is safe for the 
world.”26 
C.  ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
Over the last two centuries, new theories about state relations have developed. 
One of the most debated concepts is the notion of interdependence, which has taken the 
form mostly of economic interdependence. According to Mark Crescenzi, notion of 
interdependence raises two questions: “Does economic interdependence lead to peace or 
conflict between nations? When two countries enter an economic relationship 
characterized by interdependence, are they constrained in their military behavior, or are 
they adding one more source of discord?”27 
1. Kantian Interdependence 
Kant was one of the main theorists to promote the idea of interdependence as a 
way to reduce conflict. In the “Third Definitive Article in the Conditions of a Perpetual 
Peace,” he refers to cosmopolitan law, which “shall be restricted to conditions of 
universal hospitality.”28 To Kant, the meaning of hospitality, according to Michael 
                                                 
24 Layne, “Kant or Cant,” 39. 
25 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International 
Security 15:1. (Summer 1990), 11. 
26 Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 13. 
27 Mark J.C. Crescenzi, “Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict,” The Journal of Politics 65:3 
(August 2003): 809–811. 
28 Kant, Perpetual Peace, Online Library, 7, 
http://olldownload.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Kant_0056.pdf (accessed February 20, 2007). 
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Doyle, “does appear to include the right of access and the obligation of maintaining the 
opportunity for citizens to exchange goods and ideas without imposing the obligation to 
trade (a voluntary act in all cases under liberal constitutions).”29 Furthermore, and 
especially for economic interdependence, Kant claims, according to Russett and John 
Oneal, that: 
The spirit of commerce sooner or latter takes hold of every people, and it 
can not exist side by side with war. And of all the powers (or means) at the 
disposal of the state, financial power can probably be relied on most. Thus 
states find themselves compelled to promote the noble cause of peace, 
though not exactly from motives of morality. And wherever in the world 
there is a threat of war breaking out they will try to prevent it by 
mediation.30 
Doyle proposes that the development of international markets has a pacifying 
effect because it removes from state policy makers the obligation to make difficult 
decisions about production and distribution. The interdependence that is created by trade 
and the “international contacts of state officials have as an outcome the creation of 
transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation.”31 Doyle also explains 
that modern liberal beliefs accept that “international financiers and transnational and 
transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of accommodation.”32 
2. Neoliberal Institutionalist Interdependence 
During the years immediately following the end of WWII, the idea of 
interdependence became more fashionable. The main representatives of this theory, 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, who can be categorized from a theoretical perspective 
as neoliberal institutionalists, initiated a round of debates by their book, Power and 
Interdependence.33 Their main concept is that traditionalists could not adequately explain 
                                                 
29 Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” 1158. 
30 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 128. 
31 Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” 1161. 
32 Ibid. 
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conflict. Thus, their theory of interdependence is an alternative explanation that is based 
on the costs of relationships, an issue that leaders take into account during the process of 
decision making. Interdependence exists when the costs have a sufficiently high value 
that restricts autonomy.34 In their definition of “sensitivity interdependence” and 
“vulnerability interdependence,” Keohane and Nye explain the decision-making process. 
Vulnerability does not allow decision makers to have a flexible policy, since the options 
they have for a specific situation are limited. Given such a restricted condition, a use of 
force may be their only alternative. On the other hand, sensitivity, although it also implies 
costs, has asymmetry, a “source of power.” Sensitivity, therefore, provides adequate 
alternative options without creating a desperate situation for the state.35 
Keohane and Nye’s definition of “complex interdependence” embodies 
assumptions that diverge from realism. The main characteristic of “complex 
interdependence” is that “actors other than states participate directly in world politics, in 
which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist and in which force is an ineffective 
instrument of policy.”36 In contrast to liberals who suggest that interdependence on its 
own causes peace, Keohane and Nye argue that when conditions exist that closely 
resemble complex interdependence, then the likelihood of war resulting from 
interdependence is very low. 
3. Realist Interdependence 
Realist theorists provide the main critique of the liberal and neoliberal theories of 
interdependence. Realists accept that interdependence exists, but they disagree about the 
pacific role it may have. Their argument is that when states are interdependent, they try to 
reach a level of autarchy. Waltz is the main proponent of this argument. Waltz suggests 
that “Among states, the state of nature is a state of war,” one of the fundamental 
assumptions of realist theory.37 The inequality of interdependence between states is a 
                                                 
34 OKeohane, and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 9. 
35 Ibid., 18. 
36 Ibid., 24. 
37 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979, 101. 
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negative factor of their cooperation, so the question for them is not “Will both of us 
gain?” but rather “Who will gain more?”38 Since it is very unlikely that the gains will be 
equal, this will create a feeling of insecurity between them and will prevent them from 
more extensive cooperation. Moreover, he rejects the idea of sensitivity interdependence 
and suggests that interdependence mainly takes the form of vulnerability.39 
In the last two decades, theorists have worked to gather evidence to support their 
theories. Each school asserts  that the theories they support have been proven through 
empirical studies. These efforts have generated debates and critiques about the 
methodologies and results of competing research programs and their results.40 New 
theoretical approaches are now emerging to fill the middle ground between these two 
opposing theories.41 
Economic interdependence is a fact, and no school of thought denies its existence. 
Debate concentrates on the influence that economic interdependence may have on 
international relations. 
D. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The notion that international organizations would promote peace dates back as far 
as the thirteenth century. But their evolution did not begin until the early nineteenth 
century with the Congress of Vienna in 1814. A real expansion occurred during the 
                                                 
38 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 5. 
39 Ibid., 139–46. 
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twentieth century when the thirty-seven IGOs that existed in 1909 increased to 132 in 
1956 and 293 in 1990.42 According to Russett, Oneal, and David Davis:  
An IGO can be defined as a formal, continuous institution established by 
treaty or other agreement between governments, long-range in nature, 
multilateral (the Union of International Associations specifies three or 
more member states), with a secretariat and more-or-less regular meetings, 
and an ‘international legal personality’ with legal standing.43 
1. International Organizations and International Law in Kant’s Theory 
Kant’s “Second Definitive Article in the Conditions of Perpetual Peace” promotes 
the cooperation of liberal states in a universal federation. He explains that a peace treaty 
is adequate for the end of a specific war but it does not provide guarantees for the 
establishment of a generally peaceful condition among states. He accepts as the supreme 
authority of the state because “every nation is the judge of its own cause.”44 He does not 
refer to an international constitution, because states have “already within themselves a 
legal Constitution and have thus out-grown the coercive Right of others to bring them 
under a wider legal constitution according to conceptions of Right.”45 Although for Kant, 
the creation of a Nation of States would be the ideal, he recognizes that for the 
achievement of a more peaceful world, it is more feasible to create a Federation of States.  
Although men could form a state that will prevent them from fighting each other, 
this cannot be achieved between states, according to Kant, because no state recognizes a 
supreme legislative power which will secure [its] Rights and whose Right 
[it] will also secure; – then there is no intelligible basis upon which any 
security for such Rights could be founded unless it were a surrogate of the 
union embodied in Civil Society. And this can be nothing but a free  
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Federation of the State, which Reason must necessarily connect with the 
idea of the Right of Nations if there is anything further to be in connection 
with it.46 
The idea of a free federation of states represents the will of states to cooperate 
through the logic of international law and international organizations (IGOs). Although 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) may be influential in promoting 
peace, the fact that they are driven mostly by individuals or private organizations does 
not permit them to represent the will of states. 
Doyle suggests that Kant’s thoughts about international law and the federation of 
states probably referred to a “mutual non-aggression pact, perhaps a collective security 
agreement.”47 Today it is believed that IGOs’ promotion of peace is based in their 
functions, which fall into six categories: 
1. Coercing Norm Breakers 
2. Mediating among Conflicting Parties 
3. Reducing Uncertainty by Conveying Information 
4. Problem Solving 
5. Socialization and Shaping Norms 
6. Generating Narratives of Mutual Identification.48 
Russett, Oneal, and Davis also find that, apart from the direct effects that IGOs 
have in promoting peace, they also may indirectly reduce the possibilities of conflict by 
promoting democracy and interdependence.49 The increase in economic activities of the 
citizens of liberal democratic states which develop higher volumes of interdependence 
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facilitate trade and investment. In other words, international law and institutions are 
established by citizens of democratic states pursuing their interests throughout the 
world.50 
International organizations and international law are interrelated. The former are a 
form of expression of the latter. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), a Dutch scholar, jurist, and 
diplomat, is accepted by many as “the father of the law of nations” for his De Jure Belli 
ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace). Although his influence has fluctuated over 
time, many of his doctrines survive in contemporary notions of international law, defined 
by Barry Carter as “the distinction between just and unjust war, the recognition of the 
rights and freedoms of the individual, the doctrine of qualified neutrality, the idea of 
peace, and the value of periodic conferences between the rulers of states.”51 
Grotius’s De Jure Belli falls between Hobbes’s notion that states are free to act in 
the international arena pursuing their goals without moral or legal restrictions and Kant’s 
moral views about the cosmopolitan society. Grotius suggests that states are the main 
actors in an international society, where they are bound by the rules of that society.  
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the idea of an international society 
referred mostly to European society, but during the twentieth century the notion 
expanded into a concept of a world society.52 The formation of this society would be the 
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2. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism  
Functionalism and neofunctionalism present a more specific approach to the 
pacific effects of international organizations and political integration. Their approach 
finds that there is a qualitative distinction between politics and administration.54  
Functionalism and neofunctionalism suggest that common needs can lead people 
to unification and more pacific relations. David Mitrany, a leading scholar of 
functionalism in the twentieth century, suggests that political segregation hampers 
peoples’ efforts toward and need for cooperation. Thus, he proposes an “international 
house-building,” whereby international politics will become clearer and more easily 
adopted. His analysis concludes that a loose association of states, like the United Nations, 
which “rest[s] upon national separateness … is inadequate in scope and uncertain in 
working.”55 Mitrany criticizes the ideal of creating a federal system because it would lead 
to a different type of nationalism. Federations may be competitive with other political 
entities and thus they provide little evidence that they may contribute to peace.56 A 
functional approach “emphasizes the common index of need,” in contrast to the federal 
(or constitutional) approach which “emphasizes the individual index of power.”57 
Following this approach, with the creation of a large number of international 
organizations where states can be members in more than one and where the 
administrative experts have a dominant role, could lead to a “world government.”58 A 
basic functional hypothesis is that, since people’s “loyalties are created by functions,” the 
transfer of functions to the international level may also shift loyalties to that level.59 
Neofunctionalism, although its follows the basic lines of functionalism, differs in 
that it emphasizes regional integration rather than world integration. As Ernst Haas points 
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out, “voluntary groups coming from a regional setting are much more likely to achieve 
integration than an organization consisting of representatives from the entire globe.”60 
Neofunctionalism also suggests that the “spillover effect” from a specific sector will lead 
to integration in other sectors.  
3. Realist View  
Realism provides the major critique of the pacific role of international law and 
institutions. According to Mearsheimer, the anarchical international system of states is a 
“brutal arena” where states try to take advantage of one another. Thus, although states 
may cooperate, this behavior is limited because the international rules affect “state 
calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power.”61 
Mearsheimer argues that states are aware of relative gains among them and cheating by 
others, two issues that are highly related to the fundamental assumption of realists about 
the balance of power.62 Cooperation is a result of the politics of self-interest rather than 
the common interest. Institutions are a creation of the most powerful states to preserve 
order, which favors their predominance in the international system 63   
4. Reply to Realist BeliefAn argument used by realists to refute the power 
of international law and organizations to affect states’ behavior concerns their lack of 
binding force. Waltz argues, for instance, that “most international law is obeyed most of 
the time, but strong states bend or break laws when they choose to.”64 Christian Reus-
Smit, however, challenges that realist skepticism and identifies three main problems in 
the realist argument: 
1. Lack of explanation of the growing body of law 
2. Lack of explanation of how law constrains strong states 
                                                 
60 Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, 22. 
61 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19:3 
(Winter 1994/95): 7–13. 
62 Prisoners’ dilemma under the realists’ assumptions leads to defect. 
63 Mearsheimer. “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 13. 
64 Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 27. 
 21
3. Lack of explanation of how weak states and other actors use the law to 
shape outcomes.65 
William Slomanson provides a metaphorical explanation of states’ behavior in 
relation to international law: 
The national decision to voluntarily observe International Law is premised 
on self-interest and the survival instinct emerging at various international 
intersections. Self-interested States recognize that is in their best interest 
to comply with the mutual expectations of International Law. Like most 
motorists, who observe almost all traffic laws almost all of the time, 
national interests are served best by a prevailing international order.66 
International organizations and international law have been continuously 
developing during the 20th century. This fact by its one proves the importance that they 
have in international relations although that different schools of thought have different 
explanations about their influence and purpose.   
E.  CONCLUSION 
While Kant admits that states are the main actors in the international arena and 
that war and conflict comprise a fact of human relations, he nonetheless suggests in 
Perpetual Peace that peace in the world is feasible. Such an idea was bold in the age of 
reason and the era of the wars of the cabinets in the 18th century and it seems equally as 
bold in the early 21st century.  Yet, the record of the construction of “Europe” argues for 
the likely efficacy of this radical idea.  
Democracy is a form of governance that constrains people to decide in favor of 
war because they are aware of its costs. Democracy promotes transparency and predictive 
state behavior, which allows opponent democracies to act less violently. On the other 
hand, realists believe that domestic structures do not influence international politics. The 
world overall comprises an anarchical state system within which self-interest prevails and 
balance of power is the norm.  
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For Kant, the development of economic and trade relations has a pacific role in 
international relations. And while the pacifying effect of economic interdependence has 
no moral motives, it constrains people from choosing war, since the economic costs are 
unfavorable.  
Realists believe that economic interdependence has a negative effect on 
international relations. It adds one more parameter for conflict because it is almost never 
equal and relative gains are states’ major concern.  
Neoliberal institutionalists are positioned between those two theoretical 
approaches. They believe that interdependence may promote peace in the event that it 
takes the form of sensitivity, where states have more than one political option. On the 
other hand, when interdependence takes the form of vulnerability, it may lead to conflict. 
Kant, however, admits that “perpetual peace” is not a condition that can be easily 
achieved. The creation of a pacific federation of liberal republican states is the goal, 
although he also admits that a global state would be the ideal type of world governance. 
Liberals believe that the development of international organizations that address 
international law among states restricts states from arbitrary political behavior. 
Functionalists and neo-functionalists also support the pacifying role of IGOs. Yet they 
suggest a different theoretical explanation. They propose that the development of 
administrative structures in which technical expertise plays a crucial role comprise the 
influential parameters in peaceful relations. Realists argue that IGOs are strong state 
constructions in the effort to support the international balance of power. Thus, they obey 
international law according to their national interests. 
But theoretical debates have no value if they cannot be proved in practice. Russet 
and Oneal claim in their study, Triangulating Peace, that each Kantian element 
individually “makes a statistically significant, independent contribution to peaceful 
interstate relations.” And the “magnitude of their combined effect is . . . particularly 
striking. The likelihood of a dispute falls by 71 percent if all three variables are increased 
simultaneously above their baseline rates.”67 
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Kantian theory is supported by contemporary relations between France and 
Germany. During the last two centuries, the European continent was a battlefield that 
resulted in the deaths of millions of people. During that era, France and Germany were 
enemies and their foreign policies were dominated by mistrust of one another. After the 
end of WWII, the will to heal the wounds of war and fear of Soviet communism drove 
European states closer to one another. The efforts to create a European Defense 
Community in the 1950s were not successful, however, because of France’s lingering 
fear of a German resurgency.68 As a result, cooperative efforts were diverted to the 
economic field.  
The European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor of the European 
Economic Community and later the European Union, was based on the perspective of 
French officials that their policy toward Germany should be based on economic 
association rather than political antagonism.69 This shift in French policymakers’ foreign 
policy did not mean that their fears of Germany were alleviated immediately.70 Through 
extensive economic and political cooperation, the two states, under EC/EU organization, 
merged their economic and military institutions.  Today, the possibility of war between 
them is considered to be nonexistent. 
The gradual erosion of enduring rivalries in Western Europe creates a hope that 
the development of the three Kantian elements may have a positive influence in other 
areas of the world beset by traditional conflicts. One of these “hot” areas is Southeastern 
Europe, where relations between Greece and Turkey can be characterized as an enduring 
rivalry.  
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III. GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE 
PAST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Greek-Turkish relations present something of a paradox in contemporary 
international relations. Although Greece and Turkey have been allies since the early 
1950s as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there has been a 
gradually escalating tension in their bilateral relations. The rhetoric and arguments used 
by both nations in their international interactions have focused on their national interests 
and national rights. During the last forty years, those policies brought the two states close 
to war in almost every decade. Efforts to reduce the tension have not yet been sufficient 
to mitigate the causes of their mutual hostility.  The tensions affecting Turkey connected 
with the crisis in the Middle East and the future construction of Europe suggest a link to 
the evolution of Greek-Turkish conflict. 
In 1999, a rapprochement occurred, initiated by a Greek shift in policy in regard 
to Turkey’s European Union candidacy. Together with the peoples’ sympathetic response 
to the disastrous earthquakes that hit both countries that same year, this change initiated 
diplomatic move toward detente between them. Yet, the rapprochement had no positive 
impact in terms of ending the issues keeping the two states apart.  
Analysts and scholars from both countries continue to debate the political and 
legal aspects of the controversy. The histories of the two states and their national 
identities have determined the perceptions they hold of themselves and their neighbors.  
Those perceptions influence both the general populace and the political elite 
thinking about relations between Greece and Turkey. This chapter describes the 
development of Greek–Turkish relations. Its purpose is not to analyze the legal or 
political status of the bi-lateral relationship, but to provide a third perspective that will 
help the reader to understand the deeper reasons for tension across the Aegean.  
 26
The chapter presents a historical review of the national formation of both Greece 
and Turkey because their histories are closely related. Next, it analyzes the development 
of their national identity. National history and the emergence of a national identify are 
closely related. In closing, the chapter describes the contemporary issues of dispute that 
have arisen during the last half of the twentieth century that remain unresolved today. 
B. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS  
The Greek–Turkish relationship dates back at least a thousand years, long before 
the modern Greek and Turkish nations existed. At the time, the Byzantine Empire, the 
eastern part of what was then the Roman Empire, was predominantly Greek-Christian. 
But the defeat of the Byzantines in 1071 in the battle of Matzikert allowed Turkish-
speaking tribes from central Asia to establish themselves in Anatolia, also known as 
Minor Asia, which is now Turkey. Over the next four centuries, a continuous expansion 
by the Ottomans, the dominant tribe, led to their capture of Constantinople, which later 
became known as Istanbul. This marked the end of the Byzantine Empire and its 
replacement by the Ottoman Empire that extended across much of the same territory.71  
The modern history of Greece is directly related to the fate of the Ottoman 
Empire, the so called “eastern question,” and its successor-state, Turkey. Their 
relationship, which originated in the eruption of the Greek revolution for independence in 
1821, was based on two key factors. One was the emergence of modern nation states and 
nationalism in Western Europe, which also led to the emergence of Greek nationalism as 
part of a greater trend in Europe as a whole. Another important factor was the gradual 
weakening of the Ottoman Empire.. This decline, together with the interference of the 
era’s Great Powers –Great Britain, France, Austria, and Russia –were the decisive factors 
that allowed the establishment of the Greek state a decade later.72 
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The great transformations that took place in Europe during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries influenced dramatically the newly formed nation state of Greece 
and the eclipse of the Ottoman Empire. The continuous wars involving the Ottoman 
Empire in the 19th century, which culminated in World War I, and the industrialization of 
Western Europe, created an imbalance of power. Greece gained territories in which the 
Greek-speaking Christians were the majority, at the expense of the Ottomans. With the 
end of World War I came the end of the Ottoman Empire. Greece, as an ally of Entente 
gained new territories in Thrace and on the western coast of Anatolia, which had a large 
Greek-speaking Christian population.73 
The final development in this history was a war (1919–1922) between Greece and 
the new state of Turkey, successor of the Ottoman Empire. The ultimate defeat of Greece 
allowed the Turks to go to the negotiating table with a high level of self-confidence and 
to renegotiate the Paris suburb treaty, i.e. Sevres Treaty.74 Thus, in 1923, the Lausanne 
Treaty, between the Great Powers, Turkey, and the Balkan states, oriented new borders 
and provided for the national orientation of each state.75 As a result, a large number of 
population exchanges (i.e. ethnic cleansing) were initiated, especially between Greece 
and Turkey. Although Greece was not in favor of this exchange, the fact that it had been 
defeated in the last war weakened its diplomatic influence. About 1.2 million Greek-
speaking Christian Orthodox, mostly from Anatolia, were moved to Greece, and about 
500,000 Muslims from Greece moved into Turkey.76 The settlement of the Lausanne 
Treaty allowed a relatively small minority of Greeks to remain in Istanbul, together with 
the Christian Orthodox Patriarchate, and an almost equal number of Muslims to remain in 
western Thrace. These exchanges led to a relative homogeneity among the overall Greek 
population and the elimination of most of the non-Muslim populations in Turkey. 
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In the aftermath of the Lausanne Treaty, concessions by the leaders of the two 
states, Eleftherios Venizelos of Greece and Mustafa Kemal of Turkey, promoted the 
political development of a Greek–Turkish friendship. The following decades were 
therefore characterized by relatively good relations. Greece entered WWII on the side of 
the Allies, while Turkey remained neutral.  As a result, Greece received the islands of 
Dodecanese in the southeast Aegean, which were previously under Italian domain, as a 
reward for her contribution to the war. This was the last territorial rearrangement in the 
region. 
After 1952, the unproblematic relations between the two countries, which were 
rooted in the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty and the Venizelos–Kemal 
rapprochement, were further bolstered by the participation of both states in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. But the era of détente in their bilateral relations ended 
during the mid-1950s when the Cyprus problem arose in the wake of the British ejection 
from Egypt.  
The population in Cyprus, which was then under British rule, was a mixture of 
Greek and Turkish origin. The Greek-Cypriot independence movement raised Turkish 
fears of a change in the balance that had been established between the two states by the 
Lausanne treaty. The British employed Turkish elements against the Greek nationalists 
on Cyprus. During the next decade, there was an escalation of tension between Greece 
and Turkey. Because of official and unofficial pressure from Turkey, the Greek minority 
in Istanbul grew smaller and smaller. Finally, in 1974, after a Greek junta failed to 
establish a new government that would lead to the island’s unification with Greece, 
Turkey invaded and there was a de facto partition of the Island.77 
Since the crisis in Cyprus, tension between the two states has increased. Efforts to 
relax the tense situation proved fruitless until 1999 when a rapprochement occurred, 
initiated primarily as part of Turkey’s attempt to become a member of the European 
Union. There also was spontaneous outpouring of support from average Greeks and  
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Turks for the plight of the other following the disastrous earthquakes that hit both 
countries in 1999. Yet, the rapprochement did not succeed in bringing an end to the 
controversy.  
C. NATIONALISM IN GREECE AND TURKEY 
1. The Origins of Greek Nationalism 
The Greek national idea was imported from the West. And the newly emerged 
western-European states’ nationalist notions were, in turn, decisive in the way Greeks 
perceived “Greek-ness.” Initially, the term “Greek” was used disparagingly to define the 
Orthodox Christians, who had retained paganistic elements from ancient Greece among 
their beliefs and certain rites. With the rise of classicism and nationalism in Britain and 
France in the eighteenth century, ancient Greece was back in fashion among the educated 
middle class and those who fostered cultural nationalism on the continent of Europe. The 
varying national consciousness that developed in Europe led to a greater understanding of 
others’ national identity as well. Inevitably, the question of what had happened to ancient 
Greece became directed at and focused on the region of its historic geographic location. 
The fact that western-European nationalists used ancient Greece as a model led to a belief 
in the existence of a Greek nation.78 
These were the ideas that influenced the Greek-speaking intellectuals and the 
merchants of the Ottoman Empire who came in contact with them during their 
educational endeavors or their travels to Western Europe during the late eighteenth 
century. Efforts to build a Greek nation were not directed at the development of a 
territorial ethnic state, but rather at the creation of an ethnic feeling that would recover 
the nationalist pride of the ancient Greeks. 
This essentially ethnic movement, which led to an uprising against the Ottoman 
Empire, was influenced by two other factors. One was the Russia’s effort to promote 
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itself as the successor of the Byzantine Empire and the patron of the Orthodox Christians. 
Another factor was the social conflict between brigands and notables. Out of that 
revolution came the emergence of the Greek state. 
Initially, Greek nationalism was basically a civic and individualistic movement. 
Anyone who had been born in Greece and was a Christian was accepted as Greek. Thus, 
domestic and religious factors were the prerequisites for acquiring a Greek identity. 
Later, irredentist ideas gradually promoted an effort to organize the country and to relieve 
the internal tensions. The Great Powers’ sense of betrayal and pressure from the Greek-
speaking population of the Ottoman Empire led to the notion of a “Megali Idea,” or Great 
Idea. Its goal was the liberation of Greek-speaking population and, more loosely, the 
reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire. As religion became a critical factor, Greek 
nationalism gradually shifted to an ethnic-collectivistic type aimed at the expansion of the 
state and the liberation of the Christian-Orthodox “hellenophones” (Greek-speaking 
population).79  
This new form of nationalism influenced the policies of Greece and led to a 
continuous effort to achieve the Megali Idea’s goals. Until 1922, Greece was in a process 
of expansion through wars especially in the years prior to 1914. Following the disastrous 
war of Asia Minor against Turkey, however, the Lausanne Treaty (1923) initiated the 
decline of irredentist nationalism in Greece.80 Given the exchange of population, the 
rhetoric about the liberation of Greeks abroad did not have the same basis as before and 
gradually lost its influence on the politics of the country.  
It was not revived until the rise of the Cyprus problem in the 1950s, which 
involved a population mix of Greeks and Turks. Since the island was then a British 
colony, no provisions were made for it in the Lausanne Treaty. The independence of the 
island from the British rule in 1960 did not solve the problem. One final act that may be  
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characterized as Greek irredentism was the unification effort attempted by the dictatorial 
government of Greece in 1974.  This effort, however, did not represent the will of the 
Greek people. 
The turning point for the Greek nationalist movement was the accession to 
European Community/European Union membership in the early 1980s. Since then, 
Greeks have slowly started to view their identity through the new perspective of a 
European identity. Yet, the Greek policy and the emotional reaction of Greek society to 
the Macedonian Question, which reemerged with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, show 
that the past is still an influential factor in Greeks’ notions of ethnic identify. Although 
Greece has not claimed any territorial changes, the feelings of pride that bestirred Greek 
nationalism are still strong. 
2. The Origins of Turkish Nationalism 
Turkish nationalism is rooted in the Ottoman Empire and it eventual collapse in 
the 20th century. Although it emerged during the same period as Greek nationalism, it 
followed a different path of development.  
The Ottoman Turks identified themselves as Muslims who were loyal to the 
Ottoman Dynasty. Even during the nineteenth century, the term “Turk” often was used to 
refer to the peasants or nomads of Anatolia, and was used to differentiate Turks from 
non-Turks.81  
The weakness of the empire in relation to the Western powers and its loss of 
territories initiated an internal search for reforms that would allow the empire to become 
competitive and strong. The doctrine of Ottomanism that developed was aimed at 
integrating all the different communities of the empire into a single Ottoman nation. With 
a patriotism essentially borrowed from Western nationalism, Ottomanism was “based on 
allegiance to dynasty, state and homeland.”82 
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The invigoration of separatist movements by the non-Muslim population of the 
Empire during the nineteenth century led it to re-emphasize its Islamic characteristics. 
This new orientation of the Empire’s identity was called Islamism. Both Islamism and 
Ottomanism were assumed to refer to all the citizens of the Empire.  
During the last decades of the century the Ottoman Empire was under extreme 
pressure from the Great Powers, who were striving to gain influence in Ottoman 
territories. The separatist movement was becoming even stronger. Ottomanism and 
Islamism were made the scapegoats by the military and the intellectual elite who aimed to 
save the Empire and demanded significant reforms. This became a new movement, called 
Turkism, whose goal was to unify the Turkish-speaking population. But Turkism soon 
divided into two different branches: Pan-Turkism and Tyranism. The former aimed at the 
political unification of the Turkish-origin population around the world; the latter sought a 
broader political unification of all the Turkish-speaking population.83 
Turkism originated with a group of intellectual elites who had learned of 
nationalism from Europe, a form of nationalism that was not only patriotism but also had 
variations that related to culture and race. An extensive literature published in Europe, a 
new scholarship of Turkology, and contact with the exiled Turkish-speaking population 
of Russia all strengthened the formation of Turkism. As David Cushner writes this new 
notion of “the Turk” suggested that, “rather than being a name for the despised nomad or 
peasant, [it] was the proud title of an independent nation (or ‘race,’ as it would often be 
referred to in the nineteenth century), spread over vast areas, with a long and glorious 
history and its own contribution to human civilization.”84 
The new nationalistic idea was supported by the Young Turks who during the last 
decades of the Ottoman Empire had gained power. Influenced by German nationalism on 
the one hand and August Conte and Emil Durkheim on the other, it lent a divine meaning 
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to the nation. Since the non-Muslim population was striving to separate from the state, 
their economic and physical elimination became the goal of the Young Turksl.85  
The next step in the development of Turkish nationalism was Kemalism, named 
for the reformer of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal. Kemal realized that Turkey needed to 
reconstruct itself by internalizing an ideology that supported the homogeneity of the state. 
Although in Turkey, technically, all members of the republic were equal, Muslims 
(including the Kurds) were said to be the “real” Turks. Yet, Islam lost its political weight 
and came simply to mean affiliation to the state. Non-Muslim communities such as the 
Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were therefore not included in this elitist community.  
When Kemal’s ideas became the doctrine of the new nation state, members of the 
state had to be secular and Western-oriented.86 Kemalist nationalism is still dominant in 
Turkish society and the polity, although some extreme forms of Pan-Turkism have arisen 
over time and succeeded in gaining political status and government positions.87 In the 
process, two fundamental issues that animate the government’s internal policies are a fear 
of the dissolution of the state and concerns about how to protect its coherence.88 
3. Perceptions of the Other 
The evolution and development of Greece and Turkey are closely related to the 
development of the nationalist beliefs in each state and have made relations between the 
two states more complicated. Over time, each state has formed a perception of the “other” 
that has greatly influenced their bilateral relations. Textbooks, historiography, and other 
literary works have promoted these perceptions. To Greeks, Turks are a barbaric enemy 
that enslaved the nation for many years, acting violently and unethically. Turks have a 
mirror image of Greeks as a people who are violent, unfaithful, unreliable, cunning, and 
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whatever slurs one might imagine. As a result of these perceptions, each state promotes a 
selective history that favors its own views.  Both sides also refer to specific historical 
facts through a form of nationalistic filtration.89  
D. GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTES 
The notions and feelings of the public in both states reflect the beliefs of their 
respective political elites. Thus, the current issues embodied in the Greek–Turkish 
dispute reflect those internalized beliefs and influence the rise and escalation of tension in 
their bilateral relations. Until recently, all attempts to deal with these disputes have had a 
negative outcome. Although a shift in Greece’s foreign policy has occurred as a result of 
Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union, which has created a more positive climate, 
the underlying issues are still at stake.  
The issues can be divided into three categories: Cyprus, Aegean Sea and minority 
issues. 
1. Cyprus Problem 
The Cyprus problem emerged during the 1950s and is largely considered the 
casus belli of the current Greek–Turkish controversy. After Cyprus gained its 
independence from British rule in 1960, the two communities on the island – one Greek, 
one Turkish – became hostile to each another. The hostility was rooted in the Greek-
Cypriots’ promotion of Enosis, unification with Greece. Turkey believed that if Enosis 
occurred, the balance of power between Greece and Turkey would be seriously changed. 
The Turkish community also believed that, in the Constitution, a solution had already 
been arranged that favored the Greek-Cypriots.  
During the next two decades, the confrontation between the two communities 
became an open dispute that culminated in 1974 in a Turkish invasion and a division of 
the island. This followed a Greek Junta attempted coup against the government of Cyprus 
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that was supposed to lead to Enosis.90 Since then, there have been many efforts to solve 
the problem, but today, the island is still divided, and it is the Turkish army that 
safeguards the division. 
2. Aegean Sea 
The second issue involves the status quo of the Aegean Sea, the Archipelago 
between the Greek and Turkish mainland. The Aegean dispute began to intensify during 
the 1970s, as the oil crises of that decade increased both Greek and Turkish concerns 
about the exploitation of the Aegean. Turkey realized that the arrangements made fifty 
years earlier that were supposed to maintain the status quo in the region no longer 
favored Turkish interests. In sum, the Aegean dispute comprises five different, 
interrelated issues. 
a. The Sovereignty of the Continental Shelf 
Greece considers the delimitation of the Continental Shelf as a legal 
dispute between the two countries.91 The Greek government argues that, since it is 
essentially a legal problem, it should be resolved by the International Court of Justice in 
The Hague. Turkey argues, however, that it should be resolved by negotiation between 
the two states. 
b. The Territorial Sea 
Greece maintains that it and the islands’ coastline extends out to six 
nautical miles of territorial sea. The Greek government has declared that, according to the 
Law of the Sea, Greece has the right to extend that to twelve miles. Turkey, which 
already has twelve miles of territorial sea as its northern and southern coastal lines and 
six miles as its western coastal line that borders the Aegean, has declared that any 
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expansion of Greece’s territorial sea will be a casus belli.92 In making this claim, Turkey 
reasons that the Aegean is a semi-closed sea and thus any expansion of Greece’s 
territorial sea would prevent Turkey’s direct access to international waters.93 
c. Air Space 
Since 1931, Greece has maintained a paradoxical ten miles of national air 
space along the Aegean, although its territorial waters are only six miles. Since 1975, 
Turkey has contested this, as Tozun Bahcheli mentions,  “by periodically sending its 
aircrafts up to six miles from the coast of the Greek Aegean islands,”94 Since 1974, 
Turkey has also refused “to submit flight plans for her military aircraft, when they fly to 
the international airspace of Athens FIR, arguing that the Chicago Convention does not 
apply to national aircraft.”95. Greece not surprisingly regards both these situations as 
violations of its national airspace and the Air Traffic Rules.  
d. Grey Zones 
During the mid-1990s, Turkey began questioning the sovereignty of some 
Greek islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean Sea, claiming that, because they were not 
mentioned specifically by name, they “were not ceded to Greece by international 
treaties.”96 Greece argues, however, that according to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, 
“Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands 
situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkey’s  
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sovereignty.”97 In early 1996, this dispute brought the two states close to war and is 
regarded by some Turkish scholars as probably the fundamental issue driving conflict in 
the Aegean today.98 
e. Demilitarization of Eastern Aegean Islands 
Turkey, recalling the 1923 Lausanne Treaty of the Straits, the 1923 
Lausanne Peace Treaty, and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, accuses Greece of illegally 
militarizing the Eastern Aegean Islands.99 But Greece claims that the 1923 Lausanne 
Treaty for the Straits was replaced by the 1936 Montreux Treaty and that Turkey was not 
even a participant in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. Furthermore, Greece argues, the 
Turkish deployment of a large military force on the coast of Asia Minor just across from 
the eastern Aegean islands, together with Turkey’s threat of a casus belli, gives Greece, 
according to the United Nations Charter, a legitimate right to defend itself.100 
3. Minorities 
Disagreements about minorities are rooted in the historical wounds of that 
continue to shape public and elite perceptions in the two nations. This category comprises 
issues that affect some of the states’ minorities, specifically, the Greek minority in 
Istanbul and the Muslim minority in western Thrace. The rhetoric used by both states 
refers primarily to violations of human rights. Periodically, whenever there is tension 
between the two states, this issue appears on the front pages of newspapers.101 Lately, 
Turkey has placed the issue directly on the agenda for discussions by both countries.E 
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E. FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES 
Both states’ responses to disputes can be characterized as reflecting typical realist 
policies. For example, the security dilemma in the Aegean has caused both to race for 
military armament. As a result, the military expenditures on both sides are among the 
highest in respect to their GDP in the region and among NATO members. “Zero-sum” 
perceptions dominate the policy-makers concerns. Whenever one tries to achieve a 
substantial gain in the international arena, the other tries to cancel it. Tension caused by 
NATO exercises and organizational functions has appeared repeatedly on the agenda for 
several years. Turkey refused the inclusion of specific islands in the Aegean in NATO 
military exercises, and, in response, Greece refused to participate. In the early 1980s, 
Turkey tried to benefit at the expense of Greece during negotiations for the re-entrance of 
Greece into the military structure of NATO.102 Greece, on the other hand, for many years 
vetoed economic help from the European Community and the European Union to Turkey, 
the Customs Union, and, in general, the overall procedures for Turkish accession to 
European institutions.103  
F. CONCLUSION 
Greeks and Turks have long had a close association with one another. Both 
countries’ national identities, cultures, and  ideologies have come out of a struggle to 
create a unified state. Their national identities have been formed through the wars they 
have fought, and their national pride is in part based on this martial tradition. Thus, their 
perceptions of themselves and of their neighbor continues to influence their bilateral 
relations today. Since the national interests of the two states seem to be in frequent 
conflict, arrangements introduced seven decades ago that were supposed to produce 
stability to the region are now inadequate. Many issues of disagreement that have arisen 
during the last thirty years are still at stake, and the feelings of mistrust that each state has 
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for the other are a very strong contributing factor to their poor relations. Although many 
efforts were made in the past to begin negotiating procedures, no positive outcome has 
emerged. 
Nonetheless, in 1999, a new era began when a shift in Greece’s foreign policy 
created the incentives for a rapprochement between the two states. The peoples’ 
expression of sympathy after the disastrous earthquakes of that year showed that the 
nationalistic bitterness that had been cultivated for years was not so strong anymore. 
Some of the low-level policies that the states have followed since then have been a 
welcome positive development in their bilateral relations. And scholars and politicians 
alike have expressed expectations that those policies would gradually expand to a other 
diplomatic and political relations between the two countries. But a necessary prerequisite 
for such a development is that the beliefs and the notions that each party has toward the  
other have to change. Indeed, since policy makers are influenced by the opinions of the 
general populace, a procedure targeted at the broadening of public knowledge about the 
countries’ common history seems essential to achieving a mutual goal of improving 
relations.   
 40
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IV. KANTIAN PEACE IN PRACTICE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Kant, in his work entitled Perpetual Peace, suggests that the development of 
democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations and international 
law may promote peace among states. Yet, this is an ideal set of conditions in 
international relations. These three elements of the Kantian peace have just recently 
occurred in human history. They emerged the last two centuries. The spread of these 
ideas has occurred during the second half of the 20th century. 
This chapter will determine if the three Kantian elements are present in Greek-
Turkish relations.. Initially, the chapters explores development of the political systems of 
each state and the role they played during the international crises that occurred between 
the two states in the second half of the 20th century. The development of the Greek and 
Turkish economies will be explored and the economic ties that exist between them will 
be identified. The last section of the chapter will describe the bilateral relations between 
the two states and their relationships with three important international organizations: the 
United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European Union.  
B. DEMOCRATIC PEACE 
Greek-Turkish relations have been turbulent for many years. The tension between 
them arose from their diverse national interests and history as nation states. This section 
begins by analyzing the development of the political system of the two states. It then 
discusses the effect that domestic politics has had on their bilateral relations, especially 
during the crisis that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. 
1. The Evolution of Greece’s Political System 
Although the great powers of the era believed that Greece would be a kingdom, 
soon after its independence in the first half of the nineteenth century, Greece developed a 
parliamentary political system. Yet, the political system that developed was based more 
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on the struggles among the elite for power than on popular demands. Thus, patronage, 
rather than service in the public interest, became a dominant political practice. 
Nevertheless, “majoritarian rule” became stronger. By the end of the century, the so-
called Constitutional Monarchy of the early years had become a Crowned Democracy. 
State institutions, according to Fotini Bellou, “were just about on a par with those 
functioning in advanced countries like Britain and France.”104 
Events during the first three decades of the twentieth century were a decisive 
factor in the set back that occurred in the evolution of the Greek political system. 
Although Greece more than doubled in size, the fact that it had to fight continuous wars – 
the Balkan wars, World War II, and the disastrous war in Asia Minor, which resulted in a 
huge wave of more than a million refugees from Turkey -- created political instability. 
The continued existence of the monarchy had long been questioned, which that led to a 
schism in the populace in 1915. From 1922 until 1936, more than twenty coups and coup 
attempts were initiated by military officers, both royalists and republicans. This cleavage 
determined the political scene until 1936 when a parliamentarian dictatorship was 
established by Ioannis Metaxas.105  
The years following World War II were characterized by a second Greek schism. 
At the insistence of the British, the monarchy was reestablished in Greece, although the 
general populace and Greek politicians were not in favor of this development.106 The 
civil war of 1946–1949 between communists and loyalists introduced another polarizing 
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general, however, there was no real class struggle. Instead, as Dimitris Keridis argues, the 
political parties were mostly “the products and the carrying agents of the two great 
historical conflicts of 1915 and 1946–1949.”108 
U.S. interference in Greece’s political life began at Yalta, with the inclusion of 
Greece in the West’s sphere of influence. Britain was unable to support this strategy, 
while the Soviet Union threatened Greece’s political status. From 1947 until 1974, the 
American influence on the political scene was more than obvious in Greece. Especially 
during the 1950s, according to Theodore Couloumbis, “U.S. preferences were reflected 
on matters such as election laws, specific composition of cabinets, and in personnel 
selection and promotion to key positions in the armed forces, intelligence agencies, and 
security services.”109  
But the right-wing governments of the 1950s were challenged by the rise of the 
center-left during the 1960s. Political tension between the palace, which was striving to 
gain power against politicians, and among the political coalitions, dominated the 1960s. 
Finally, in April 1967, a coup by young army officers, known as the Colonels, abolished 
democracy. The rhetoric they used presented their action as a necessary act against the 
communist threat facing the country. Yet, no such threat actually existed. The 
Communist party was divided into two factions: one pro-Soviet, the other pro-European. 
The major motivation of the coup was in reality a fear that the center-left would gain 
more power in the elections to be held the following month.110 
In December, following the failure of a monarchist counter-coup, the king fled 
into exile. The military junta then established a repressive regime that lasted for seven 
years. It found no sympathizers among the population. In 1973, large-scale student 
demonstrations erupted which resulted in a brutal response from the regime. The Turkish 
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invasion and partition of Cyprus in the summer of 1974, a reaction to a Greek-led coup 
against Makarios, the president of Cyprus, was the junta’s final act.111 
Since then, Greece has enjoyed an era of continuing democratization. 
Konstantinos Karamanlis, a gifted and strong politically right-wing personality, was 
affirmed in two consecutive elections and led the country for the rest of the decade. His 
decision to legitimize the communist party, which had been outlawed since 1947, was a 
major step toward democratization. That decision, together with the abolition of the 
monarchy after a referendum which rejected it by 70 percent, were the major events that 
helped Greece overcome the political schisms of 1915 and 1949-1949 dividing the 
populace.112  
Karamanlis also tried to accelerate Greece’s accession in the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Richard Clogg writes that his efforts focused on three main issues: 
“the deterioration in relations with Greece’s traditional patron, the United States, 
safeguards for her newly re-established democratic institutions, and protection against the 
Turkish threat.”113 
The real test of Greece’s new democratic system was the smooth transition of 
power to Andreas Papandreou’s socialistic party, PASOK, in 1981.114 The party 
represented the center-left, which had been out of power for about fifty years (with a few 
short-time exceptions).115 The fear at the time that a new junta would arise never came 
true, and until today, democracy in Greece remained unchallenged. During the years 
following the fall of the junta, Greece’s democracy developed. Its first real step toward 
modern democratization (Europeanization) occurred in 1996 when the PASOK 
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government, under the leadership of Kostas Simitis, tried to bring Greece into closer 
compliance with the European Union’s political and economic standards.116 
This new era also was characterized by a new decision-making in Greek foreign 
policy. Previously, individuals dominated this process and a populist approach to foreign 
policy id not support Greece’s national interests. The reforms that were introduced 
reorganized the foreign affairs decision-making process. The Governmental Council of 
Foreign Affairs and Defense (ΚΥΣΕΑ) became the main institution responsible for 
setting foreign policy. Yet, the major reform that came out of Greece’s democratization 
was a provision in the 2001 constitutional reform that established the National Council of 
Foreign Affairs, which includes representatives from all the parliamentarian parties.117  
In sum, the establishment of democracy in Greece has been difficult. The 
cleavages of the twentieth century stigmatized the country’s political system. Since 1974 
and the fall of the colonels’ junta, however, a modern democracy to has developed. The 
European Union’s role in fostering this reform proved decisive: it was both guarantor and 
a model for the process of democratic reform. 
2. The Evolution of Turkey’s Political System 
Turkey’s political system is the product of major historical events in the early 
twentieth century. Mustafa Kemal’s predominance in laying the foundations of the 
Turkish state dominated its political evolution in the 1920s and 1930s. This evolution 
attained a high level of popular acceptance; Kemalism remains influential today.  
Kemal emerged as the leader of Turkey during its war of independence. But his 
dominance did not go unchallenged. During the early 1920s, he established his primacy  
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against the principal leftist movements. In this effort, his unchallenged authority over the 
army proved very helpful. When Turkey became a republic in 1923, he was elected its 
first president by the national assembly.118  
Kemal’s first move was to transfer the capital from Istanbul to Ankara, in an 
attempt to weaken the traditional political forces of the Ottoman Empire. Kemal’s main 
goal was to achieve a European level of modernity by reforming the traditional 
hierarchical political system. Two strategic political acts – the abolition of the caliphate 
in 1924 and the establishment of a new republican constitution – severed forever 
Turkey’s ties with the past.119  
The political system that Kemal introduced, however, was more of an 
authoritarian one-party regime than a democratic system.120 It was rooted in the beliefs of 
the Young Turks about reformist planning. As Eric Zurcher puts it:  
when the choice was between a democratic system with a slower pace of 
reform and an authoritarian one with more opportunities for radical 
measures, the second alternative won out because what counted for the 
Young Turks in the end was the strengthening and survival of the state, 
democracy (or “constitutionalism” or “national sovereignty”) being a 
means to that end, not an end in itself.121  
As an ideology, Kemalism is generally a flexible concept because it was never 
defined in detail. According to Zurcher, its program as declared in 1931, consisted of six 
main principles: “republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and 
revolutionism (or reformism).”122  
After Kemal’s death in 1938, a step toward a more representative democratic 
system was taken. Ismet Inonu, who had been Kemal’s right-hand man since the 1920s, 
became the new president. Inonu followed a cautious policy in foreign affairs and 
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attempted to maintain internal political stability.123 But the economic difficulties that 
Turkey faced during the 1940s created considerable social discomfort. And, in an effort 
to relax the political tension, Inonu introduced political reforms allowed for a multi-party 
political system. Development in this direction also was a response at the end of World 
War II and pressure from the West, especially from the Americans, through the Marshall 
Plan.  The leftist parties soon became outlawed during the Cold War. Thus, Turkey’s 
political system became a dual-party system, consisting of the Republican People’s Party 
(RPP), founded by Kemal, and the Democratic Party (DP), founded by RPP defectors.124  
When the Democratic Party won the election in 1950 and the transition of 
political power was smooth and untroubled, it strengthened the general feeling of 
liberalization in the country. In an effort to further its political gains, Aydin Menderes, 
the leader of the party, relaxed the government’s repressive attitude toward religion. He 
also expanded the restrictive control of the press, the universities, and the judicial 
sector.125   
As a result of this changing environment and the country’s economic problems, 
political life during the 1950s in Turkey was generally quite tense. And on May 27, 1960, 
a military coup d’etat erupted, just as a government report was to be released about the 
links between the Republican People’s Party and the army. The coup abruptly changed 
the political scene in the country. In October, free elections returned Turkey to a 
democratic process, and a new, more liberal constitution was introduced. For the first 
time, however, through the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) the 
army gained a constitutional role in the government.126 Since then, the NSC has become 
a part of Turkey’s political life. 
During the next decade, the political scene in Turkey was characterized by a 
broadening of political representation. New political parties emerged both from the right 
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and from the left, which resulted in most of the subsequent governments to be based on 
coalitions. But the political openness of the 1960s also created much political turmoil. As 
Feroz Ahmad describes it, “Anti-Americanism polarized society into a conservative 
Right and a nationalistic and radical Left.”127 
The 1960s was an unstable era for Turkey. This political tension gradually 
emerged as violence. The government’s inability to control the political strife resulted in 
intervention, once again, by the military. On March 12, 1971, the military leaders sent a 
memorandum to the president threatening to take over the administration of the country if 
the politicians failed to form a strong government.128 When the government fell, a 
transitional “above parties” government was formed that used martial law in troubled 
areas and massive arrests to try and restore law and order.  
In 1973, the general elections returned the country to a parliamentary government, 
but the inability of the major political parties to form a self-contained government 
resulted in their dependence on small radical parties.129 This situation led in turn to 
bargaining among the political parties, which only produced further political instability. 
As Couloumbis points out, “between January 1971 and December 1979 there were 12 
minority coalition and service … governments.”130  
The political violence and the unresolved social and economic problems of the 
late 1970s led the military to intervene again on September 12, 1980.131 This time, the 
military took control of the country’s entire administration structure. Former politicians 
were denied their civil rights and, as the general political repression spread, there were 
excessive human rights violations. Despite this weak humanitarian record, the new 
regime tried to implement a neo-liberal economic transformation and to link the state to 
the IMF. 
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In 1982, the new president, General Kenan Evren, leader of the coup, brought 
offered a referendum on a new constitution. Although it was supposed to protect the 
rights and liberties of individuals, it actually created a backlash. It strengthened the power 
of both the NSC and the president and limited the freedom of the press and of trade 
unions. As Zurcher shows, it also provided that individual rights could be “annulled, 
suspended, or limited on the grounds of a whole series of considerations, including the 
national interest, public order, national security, danger to the republican order, and 
public health.”132  
Under these conditions, the country reentered a democratic process in 1983, 
which was closely controlled by the NSC. During the remainder of the decade, Turgut 
Ozal, the prime minister, tried to implement further democratization. Nonetheless, the 
1980s were characterized by the rise of the Kurdish problem and political Islam, and 
extensive clientism and patronage by the state.133  
During the next decade, Turkish political life continued to develop. With the 
continuing rise of the Kurdish problem and political Islam, the military strengthened its 
political power. Thus, the so-called “internal threat” became part of the general concept 
of defense; provisions for intervention by the military during crisis periods became 
legitimized. As Tulin Ongen concludes, it was the era of a “military republic.”134 In 
1997, the military’s augmented authority became obvious when it intervened by 
mobilizing broad sections of the society against the government, which was led by 
Islamists. The military intervention eventually resulted in the government’s stepping 
down.135 
By the late 1990s, the prospect of a Turkish European Union candidacy and 
accession became the catalyst for serious democratic reforms. The Copenhagen political 
criteria demanded the Turkey achieve “stability of its institutions, guaranteeing 
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democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of 
minorities.”136 After the 1999 European Union council in Helsinki, especially, Turkey 
began a process of continuous democratization and liberalization. Yet the European 
Union Commission’s 2006 Progress Report on Turkey criticized its inadequate reforms in 
sectors such as civil rights and freedom of expression, civil-military relations, the 
judiciary, and administration.137  
The development of Turkey’s political system has several unique characteristics. 
During the twentieth century, Turkey was a turbulent state striving to maintain its 
political basis in Kemalist principles. Clientism eventually dominated the political parties 
and society as a whole. The social and economic problems of the state allowed the 
emergence of the military as a political actor. After 1999, the prospect of membership in 
the European Union initiated a transformation process, recent developments suggest that 
political forces react to changes that lead to the loss of privileges. The political debates 
that erupted over the election of the president in spring of 2007 and the interventionist 
political rhetoric of  he military increased the political tension in Turkey. The government 
proposed constitutional reforms which, if they are finally implemented without any 
intervention, will probably extricate the political system from its past.138    
3. Domestic Politics in Greek-Turkish Disputes 
In the history of Greek-Turkish relations, disputes between the two countries have 
often resulted in a high level of tension and a potential for armed conflict. Since the 
emergence of the Cyprus problem in the mid 1950s, stability and peace in the region has 
been threatened. In the confrontations between the two states, their political systems have 
played a decisive role.  
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Tensions in Cyprus in the mid 1960s reached especially dramatic levels. In 1964, 
only America’s intervention prevented Turkey from invading. During the 1960s, , the 
political systems in Greece and Turkey were unstable, and a military coup in Greece in 
1967 worsened the situation. In addition, nationalistic feelings, which had dramatically 
increased in both states, and the support given to the two communities by their 
motherlands heightened the already flammable political situation in Cyprus.  
The Greek junta increased the political tension even more. Makarios’s 
government in Cyprus was not favored by the Colonels. As Couloumbis explains, the 
Greek junta wanted to  
remove Cyprus from the “embarrassing” status of a second Hellenic state 
where parliamentary freedoms and political rights were being respected. 
Nicosia, according to the colonels, where a number of anti-junta Greek 
language daily papers were circulating freely, was serving as a magnet of 
anti-regime Greeks and as a staging area of future anti-Greek junta 
agitation.139  
In an effort to eliminate this discomfort, the junta tried three times to kill Makarios 
without success.140  
When the Greek dictator, Georgios Papadopoulos, was replaced in late 1973 by 
another military officer, Demetrios Ioannides, it worsened the situation. Ioannides, a 
shadowy personality in the junta, who was the head of the military police, organized a 
Greek intervention in Cyprus in the summer of 1974 in an effort to overthrow Makarios 
and to establish a military regime.141 As a result of this political intervention, the Turkish 
military invaded the island, which led to its de facto partition. Turkey had initially 
requested the intervention of the guarantor states. But the unwillingness of Britain and of 
course Greece to intervene was viewed by the Turkish government as a green light to act 
unilaterally to resolve the situation.142  
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The military government in Greece apparently did not expect such an outcome. 
Nevertheless, it decided to proceed in a general military mobilization and war against 
Turkey. The fact that this did not happened was due to the refusal of the military 
commanders to obey the orders and instead to demand the restoration of democracy.143 
After the fall of the junta in Greece, the new government worked to strengthen 
and secure the new-born democratic system and tried to defuse the possibility of war with 
Turkey. The advance of Turkish forces on the island after the deadlock of peace-talks in 
Geneva in August failed to prompt a military reaction from Greece.144  
In 1976, a crisis erupted between Greece and Turkey. Tozun Bachtzeli argues that 
the Turkish government was responding to the opposition’s accusation that it was “not 
pressing Turkish claims to the Aegean vigorously” when it announced “in February 1976 
that a Turkish research ship … would conduct seismic research in disputed waters.”145 
And, in August, the Turkish research ship Hora (later named Sismic I), escorted by 
Turkish Navy warships, conducted seismic research for three days along the Greek-
claimed continental shelf. In response, the Greek political opposition to the socialist party 
demanded the sinking of the ship.146 In an effort to relax the tension, the Greek 
government acted less aggressively. Karamanlis, the prime minister, preferred to proceed 
to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice at The Hague.147 
An almost identical situation occurred in the next decade. In March 1987, tension 
between the two states about the continental shelf reached a crisis. Greece’s decision to 
proceed in its search for oil in areas outside its territorial waters prompted Turkey to send 
a research ship to the Aegean. Both states mobilized their military forces and there was 
great fear that the confrontation would escalate into armed conflict. Clogg writes that the 
response of the prime minister of Greece, Andreas Papandreou, was to declare “that all 
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necessary measures would be taken to safeguard the country’s sovereign rights.”148 
Greece tried to internationalize the crisis by informing the Warsaw Pact and ambassadors 
from its North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners about the situation. Finally, Turgut 
Ozal, the Turkish prime minister, decided to withdraw the Turkish ship into Turkish 
territorial waters, while Greece decided to avoid drilling oil in disputed areas.149 
The next crisis that occurred between Greece and Turkey was in late 1995. An 
accident involving a Turkish ship initiated a dispute about the status of the small island of 
Imia (called Kardak by the Turks) in the eastern Aegean. The escalation of the crisis soon 
brought the naval forces of the two states into the area. As they mobilized their military 
forces, the possibility of an armed conflict seemed high. The Greek government, looking 
for a way to relieve the tension, asked the United States to mediate. This action had a 
positive effect; the two states withdrew their forces from the area.150 Kostas Simitis, the 
Greek prime minister, suggested that the Turkish actions were strongly related to the 
political instability that Turkey was facing during this period and that, according to the 
Turkish press, it was an effort by the Turkish military to support the government.151 
Since then, no major crisis has emerged between the two states, although 
disagreements still exist. Incidents like the collision between a Greek and a Turkish 
military aircraft, witch resulted in the death of the Greek pilot, failed to create much 
pressure on either side to escalate confrontations or accidents.152  
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The Cyprus problem arose during an era when the democratic institutions in both 
states were weak.153 It escalated and ended in armed conflict when Greece was under a 
military, non-democratic regime. Since then, whenever a crisis has emerged, escalation 
has been avoided by wise government decisions. Yet, the existence of relatively weak 
democratic governments has had a negative effect. Tension in the countries’ bilateral 
relations may be used as a political tool in domestic politics. Especially in Turkey, the 
crises of 1974, 1976, and 1996 were closely related to the domestic political tension. 
Greece, which has developed a more liberal, Western-type democracy, seems less willing 
to exploit negative bilateral relations as a tool in domestic politics. 
C. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN PRACTICE 
By the end of World War II, Greece had entered a new, difficult period. A five-
year civil war between the pro-communist Democratic Army and the government’s 
National Army initiated an era of instability. The United States’ fear of communism led it 
to support Greece through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. These programs 
established the background for Greece’s economic policy and reconstruction efforts for 
the following decade. Greece’s medium- and long-term economic plans, which were 
created in conformance with the Marshall Plan, were its initial movements toward 
economic development and stability in the post-war era.154 
In the years that followed, Greece reached the economic level of the pre-war era 
and by the mid-fifties achieved a rapid growth rate. Yet, the policies that followed 
constituted a paradox. According to Pakos Theofanis and Susanna-Maria Pleologou, “On 
the one hand we have a declaration of faith toward the Free Market Economy and the 
precedence of the private sector, and on the other hand we have an extensive, 
                                                 
153 Turkish political instability and competition, which was highly related to party fragmentation, 
influenced dramatically the political decisions in Turkey. Although that the crisis tried to be used as a 
political advantage by the coalition government of Bulet Etsevit, finally it fall-apart a few months later. See 
Fiona Adamson, “Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus 
Crisis,” Political Science Quarterly 116:2 (Summer 2001): 295–296.  
154 Pakos Theofanis and Susanna-Maria Paleologou, “The Development of Greek Economy: A 
Political Economy Perspective,” in Christos Kollias and Gulay Gunluk-Senesen, Greece and Turkey in the 
21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation, A Political Economy Perspective, New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., 2003, 52. 
 55
multilateral, and resourceful state intervention in the functioning economy.”155 That state 
intervention was intended to attract foreign investments and to protect the capital of the 
economic elites of the country. These elites did not let Greek governments adopt policies 
that would resolve specific difficulties that firms, industries and regions were 
confronting.156 This reluctance to threaten the interests of the privileged, together with 
the international economic events of the 1970s, led to a decline in the Greek economy’s 
performance during the 1980s and the early 1990s. High inflation rates, weak balance of 
payments, large and growing trade deficits and high unemployment rates characterized 
the Greek economy during this era.157 
Although Greece’s accession to the European Economic Community (ECC) in 
1981 caused regional and structural funds to flow in the country, it did not prompt strong 
economic development. The new socialistic government that took power in the mid 
1990s, and the efforts to join the European Monetary Union (EMU), were the turning 
points in contemporary Greece’s economy. The reforms that were implemented led the 
country to the Eurozone and today to its status as the second most developed country 
after Israel in the broader region.158 
In the twentieth century, the Turkish economy was based on three factors that had 
their roots in the early years of Mustafa Kemal’s establishment of the republic: a mixed 
economic framework, a policy of industrialization, and economic nationalism.159 The 
difficulties resulting from the global economic depression of the 1930s also affected 
Turkey. The efforts of the government to stabilize the economy led to the creation of a 
mixed economic framework through the creation of state economic enterprises. This led 
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to a monopolistic state. Social, political, and cultural factors dictated the spread of the 
industry to various areas of the country outside of Istanbul where it was already 
developed. Fears of foreign power intervention, inherited by Turkey from the era of 
Ottoman Empire, created hostile feelings about foreign capital. This together with 
political tendencies for self-sufficiency and national pride were the main factors of the 
economic nationalism that prevented foreign investments.160  
During the post–WWII era, Turkey became a multiparty state. It developed both a 
working and a middle class and, through the Marshall Plan, it received economic aid. The 
need for economic reform was part of the political debate during the 1960s. The global 
changes of the 1970s did not affect Turkey significantly and, as a result, the growth rates 
of the Turkish economy were generally moderate in relation to the global trends.161 
A shift to a more liberal economy was initiated in the 1980s by the government 
that came into power by a military coup. According to Sungur Savran “the Turkish 
economy and polity [began to prepare for] the new path of capital accumulation 
predicated on a deeper integration with the world capitalist economy,”162 World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund programs supported the liberalization of the economy 
through structural adjustment programs.  
This shift in Turkey’s economic strategy also supported its European Community 
prospects. Yet, a lack of the political reforms that the European Community required for 
new membership, together with European interest about the eastern European countries 
prevented Turkey from achieving accession status during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
turning point in European Union–Turkish relations was a decision at the 1999 European 
Union Helsinki summit during which Turkey was offered pre-accession status with 
accession negotiations to begin in 2005.163 
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Today, Turkey’s economy is on a path of reform in an effort to satisfy the 
European Union criteria. Serious developments have been made towards the structural 
transformation of the economy. But issues including Turkey’s low per-capita income, 
unemployment, a large agricultural workforce, regional disparities, a slow pace of 
privatization, and reforms in economic legislation are still at stake.164  
1. Low Politics Agreements  
Greece and Turkey’s disputes have of course influenced their bilateral economic 
relations. For many years the political tension had a negative effect on their development 
of bi-lateral economic relations. But the new era that began in the aftermath of the 
Helsinki summit increased Turkish optimism about the prospect of European Union 
accession.165 At the level of low politics, the summit bilateral agreements produced a 
rapprochement between the two states. Most of these intergovernmental agreements 
affected bilateral economic relations and, together with the customs-union protocol that 
Turkey signed with the European Union, favor the development of trade and economic 
dealings between the two countries. The accord included: 
1. Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Tourism  
2. Agreement on Economic Cooperation  
3. Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology  
4. Agreement on Maritime Transport  
5. Agreement on Cultural Cooperation  
6. Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Customs 
Administrations  
7. Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments  
8. Agreement on Cooperation on Environmental Protection  
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9. Agreement on Combating Crime, especially terrorism, organized crime, 
illicit drug trafficking, and illegal immigration.166 
These were followed by a continuation of other agreements and protocols, mostly 
involving economics:  
1. Protocol on Technical, Scientific, and Economic cooperation in the field 
of Agriculture 
2. Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
3. Agreement on Standardization, Evaluation, and Testing 
4. Agreement on Cooperation in Health Sector 
2. Bilateral Trade167  
Turkey’s volume of bilateral trade has risen in the last decade. Gradually, the 
volume increased from 585.2 million U.S. dollars in 1996 to 846 million in 2000, 1.391 
million in 2003, and 2.124 million in 2005. In 2006, it is estimated that it reached 2.7 
billion. As these statistics show, the countries’ bilateral trade has increased by almost 500 
percent during the last decade.  
Although these economic developments do not suggest that the two countries can 
be regarded as fundamental economic partners, their future economic collaboration 
appears promising. According to 2006 economic statistics, Greece is the twelfth most 
popular trade destination for Turkish products, consuming 2.2 percent of its exports and 
is twenty-ninth in regard to Turkish imports, sharing 0.8 percent. Turkey has an even 
more important role in Greek trade, since Greece is rated as eleventh among the countries 
from which Turkey imports, with a share of 2.6 percent, and fifth among the countries 
that Turkey exports to, with a share of 5.3 percent. 
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Estimates are that Turkey’s bilateral trade with Greece will reach levels of 3 to 4 
billion dollars by the end of the decade.168 Although trade does not by itself create 
conditions of integration, it should not be underestimated as a factor that influences 
foreign policies. The four member-states of the European Union that opposed the 
accession of Cyprus before the resolution of the Cyprus Problem were the largest 
economic trade partners of Turkey in the European Union.169 In the event that trade 
between the two countries reaches higher levels and constitutes a significant percentage 
of their total trade, the changes would have to be made to accommodate common 
economic interests would be dramatic. 
3. Investments by Bi-National Corporations 
During the last decade, Greek investments have risen dramatically in Turkey. 
Greek firms have realized that the more than 70 million people that make up Turkey’s 
domestic market offers the prospect of large economic benefits. The reforms introduced 
in recent years in Turkey, especially the new laws that favor foreign investments, make 
Turkey an attractive destination for foreign direct investment.170 Although the European 
Union report on this sector suggests that more reforms need to be implemented, the steps 
that have been made are positive and encourage Greek firms to invest in Turkey. 
Greek direct investments in Turkey have exceeded 450 million Euros, even 
without taking into account a huge investment by the National Bank of Greece. 
Officially, about a hundred and thirty Greek firms have direct investments in Turkey.171 
The highest investment by far is the National Bank of Greece’s effort to gain control of 
the Turkish Finance Bank, which reached a final level of 2.8 billion dollars. Although 
this step by the National Bank was criticized as a risky step, the fact that it was taken, 
demonstrates that the finance sector is becoming highly influential in the development of 
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economic interdependence. In the aftermath of this deal, other Greek banks showed an 
interest in investing in the financial and banking sector of Turkey, and today, two other 
Greek banks have control of Turkish banks.172 The importance of the financial market is 
strengthened also by the fact that the Greek–Turkish Chamber of Commerce and the 
Izmir Chamber of Commerce have decided to create the Business Aegean Bank. With an 
initial capitalization of 100 million Euros, it will provide consultation and support to 
Greek and Turkish business and also help the implementation of European projects.173   
These investments in the financial sector are expected to encourage firms from 
other sectors to invest in Turkey. As the president of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce 
has said, “Turk businessmen believe that we can cooperate together in many sectors, like 
tourism, energy, agricultural, and food industry.”174 Greek firms also have an opportunity 
to use Turkey as the initial point in their expansion to the markets of Central Asia and the 
Caucasus.  
Energy is another strategic sector in which the two countries have shown some 
common efforts. Turkey has recently begun developing a large network of pipelines for 
the transfer of oil and gas from the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Because 
Turkey is the final destination of these energy sources, this new development makes it a 
significant global player as an energy supplier. At this point, Turkey’s cooperation with 
Greece and Greek companies is vital. One of the larger, if not the largest, commercial 
shipping fleets globally is Greek, and the need to transfer energy sources to a demanding 
global market makes bilateral cooperation inevitable.175 In addition, Greece and Turkey  
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have signed an agreement for the construction of the Southern European Gas Pipeline, 
which will provide Europe with gas from Azerbaijan through Turkey and Greece, with 
and a final destination in Italy. 
Tourism is another sector with great potentiality for cooperation between the two 
states. During recent years, the number of Greek tourists visiting Turkey has multiplied 
and tourism is now a significant source of income for many Turkish businesses. The rise 
in Greece’s per capita income and the proximity of the two states has contributed to this 
outcome. Thus, many Greek and Turkish firms are seeking ways to cooperate and 
develop common tourist packages, especially in the cruise sector serving the Aegean 
area.176 
Although foreign direct investment and bi-national corporations have been 
developing, it has not been in a balanced way. Turkish investments in Greece are few and 
many Turkish businessmen complain that they are facing difficulties with investing in 
Greece due to bureaucratic problems. The new investment law that the Greek government 
enacted in 2006 is expected to solve this problem, which should make Greece more 
attractive for foreign direct investment from Turkey.177  
4. Privatization 
Privatization is considered a fundamental process for an economy if it intends to 
be competitive in the globalized market of the twenty-first century. For Greece, the 
process initiated during the mid 1990s was an effort at achieving European Monetary 
Union criteria. Today, large sectors of the states’ business communities have been 
privatized or are proceeding toward this goal. In Turkey positive steps also have been 
made in this effort. Yet, the latest European Union Commission’s report about Turkey’s 
progress in achieving European Union membership criteria shows that there are still 
significant steps that it must take: “Restrictions on foreign ownership still exist in the 
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areas of civil aviation, maritime transport, road transport, ground handling, services, 
yachting, broadcasting, electricity, financial corporations, private employment offices, 
tourism, education, and defense sectors.”178 The question is to what extent the two 
countries will allow the other side’s involvement in investments of strategic importance. 
Mercantilist considerations about the influence and the effects that foreign investments 
may have are still strong in both states. 
Turkey considers reciprocity a prerequisite for the involvement of foreign 
investment in critical sectors. Officials of the Turkish government have declared that 
Greek financial interests may buy stocks of national businesses if the Greek side is ready 
to provide Turkish firms with the opportunity to invest in stocks of Greek governmental 
businesses that will be privatized in the future.179 
5. Mutual Investments and Cooperation in Third Countries 
The results of the cooperation and tighter economic relations may lead to the 
development of more intense economic interactions. These economic interests  recognize 
the common benefits that can be produced by cooperation and investment in third 
countries in the broader region of the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the 
Mediterranean. This will give them an opportunity to cooperate through the development 
of collaborative enterprises. 
Most of these common efforts between Greek and Turkish firms have focused on 
the Balkan region, especially in the sector of construction. European Union funds also 
can be used to support common Greek–Turkish investments. The prospect of an 
economic integration of Turkey in the European Union creates a significant economic 
prospect of benefit and supports the interests of enterprises from both countries.180 
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Apart from the Balkans, the construction sector has made significant deals in 
other regions. The most prominent of these is the consortium of the Greek AKTOR and 
the Turkish ENKA, which has undertaken a huge project for the construction of a city in 
Oman, with a cost of 20 billion dollars.181  
Businessmen from both sides were ready to deal cooperatively on such projects, 
but they are waiting for the development of the proper political climate. The fact that both 
sides have asked their governments to separate their economic relations from the bilateral 
problems is characteristic of the effort in business circles for self-governance.182 
For many years, Greek–Turkish disputes rooted in historic developments, national 
interests, and nationalistic views dominated South-Eastern Europe. Realist notions which 
were the norm in their bilateral relations prevented the development of adequate 
economic cooperation. This condition changed after the 1999 shift of Greece’s foreign 
policy toward a more liberal perspective that supported Turkey’s candidacy to the 
European Union. 
The development of low politics through mostly economic agreements initiated a 
new era in their bilateral relations. The economic figures show a stable rise in trade. And 
though it has not yet reached a level that would suggest that the two countries are 
strategic economic partners, it does allow for optimistic predictions. So far, foreign direct 
investment from Greece has been the more dynamic economic factor, especially in the 
financial sector. 
But the lack of equivalent Turkish foreign direct investment in Greece suggests an 
asymmetrical balance in dependency which may increase Turkey’s reluctance to promote 
further reforms. The Turkish reference to reciprocity for the procedure of privatization 
reveals their worry about this asymmetry. The development of common economic efforts 
in the construction and energy sectors, however, gives both sides an opportunity to have 
symmetrical participation in an economic endeavor. 
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Overall, economic interdependence between Greece and Turkey is at a low level, 
but it is on the rise. The fact that economic interests in both states suggest that the 
bilateral problems should be separated from the economic relations is an indication that 
the economic sector has a tendency to intervene in foreign policy issues. If economic 
interdependence increases, there is a possibility that a “spill-over” effect may occur in 
terms of diplomatic relations in the future.183  
D. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The number of international inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) increased 
dramatically during the twentieth century. Today, the nature of their influence and power 
around the world varies greatly; they do not all share the same specific goals or 
organizational structure. Nonetheless, all of them are supposed to promote international 
cooperation, a function that is regarded as fundamental to international order and peace.  
During the second half of the twentieth century, three IGOs became dominant: the 
United Nations (UN), the NATO, and the European Union. All three emerged after the 
disastrous WWII and in a way are related to its outcomes. Yet, the three organizations 
have fundamental differences. The UN is a global organization whose main goal is to 
promote peace. NATO emerged as an alliance against the Soviet threat and though, since 
the fall of communism, it has sought to develop a broader profile, collective security is 
still its basic goal. The European Union, initially an economic organization, has 
continued to develop and has transformed into a supranational organization, with 
political, economic, judicial, and defense structures. 
During the last fifty years, Greek-Turkish relations saw a dramatic deterioration. 
A number of times, the two states’ disputes escalated to the point that armed conflict 
seemed unavoidable. Most of their disputes arose after both countries became members 
of the UN and NATO. 
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1. United Nations  
The founding of the United Nations was the world community’s second attempt in 
the twentieth century, to establish a global institution that would prevent countries and 
peoples from fighting each other. The moral dimension of the institution is outlined in the 
words of the Preamble to the UN Charter. The respect for international norms expressed 
in international law and respect for international law itself are fundamental to this 
organization. Since the creation of the UN, however, the world has faced numerous 
conflicts which suggest that the essential goals of the UN have not yet been achieved. 
The UN has been accused of inefficiency and of being an anachronistic organization. 
In regard to Greek–Turkish disputes, the involvement of the UN has had two 
aspects. One is the Cyprus problem. The other is related to international law. 
a. Role of the UN in the Cyprus Problem 
Early in the 1950s, before Cyprus gained its independence from British 
rule, Greece sought to internationalize the efforts of the Greek Cypriots for independence 
and unification with Greece. But international politics prevented Greece’s efforts from 
succeeding. The world was divided into a bipolar system and the influence of that 
bipolarity was reflected in the council of permanent UN members where the East and the 
West were striving for dominance. The British and U.S. interests in the Middle East did 
not favor UN interference which they believed would give the Soviets an opportunity to 
interfere in the region.184 Thus, Great Britian and the United States both exerted a 
negative influence on the Greek efforts and promoted a solution through secret 
negotiations. Meeting in Zurich and London, Greece, Turkey, and Britain reached 
agreements that led to the formation of a Cyprus Constitution in 1960 and the island’s 
independence.185 
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Thus, since 1960, Cyprus, as an independent state, has had a 
representative in the United Nations. This new era in Cyprus governance, however, 
created tension between the two island communities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, 
which led finally to UN intervention. The involvement of the UN in the Cyprus problem 
falls into three categories: the UN peacekeeping operations, the UN’s internationalization 
of the problem, and the UN’s mediation efforts. 
(1) UN Peacekeeping Operations on the Island of Cyprus.  In 
1964, intrastate political disputes erupted between the two Cypriot communities. The 
constitutional arrangements that provided each party with a veto had resulted in the 
creation of a deadlock in the functioning of the state. And proposals introduced by the 
Greek-Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios, for reforms that he believed would lead 
to a more viable and practical Constitution, escalated the debate into a conflict. Soon, the 
Turkish-Cypriot contingent abandoned the government and declared that the Constitution 
was dead.186  Eventually, the UN established a peacekeeping force in Cyprus, the 
UNFICYP, which, though initially established for only three months, is still stationed on 
the island after forty-three years.187 Its role, to prevent conflict and preserve the peace 
between the two communities, was made especially difficult by the mixed population. 
Following the Turkish invasion in 1974 and the de facto partition of the island, 
UNFICYP’s role shifted to a control of the so-called green zone, which divided the 
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Zones. One of the results of that role-shift is that the 
Turkish Cypriots came to believe that the real peacekeeping force was the Turkish army. 
(2)  The UN Role in the Internalization of the Problem.   The 
internationalization of the Cyprus problem, is closely related to the UN’s peacekeeping 
operations. Oliver P. Richmond notes that:  
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The Security Council recognition which established UNFICYP on March 
1964 provided the (Greek) Cypriot government with the legitimacy and 
therefore international recognition though its reference to the “government 
of Cyprus.”188 
The UN wanted to have a reliable political entity to deal with. The 
internationalization of the problem, however, was counterproductive because it led the 
Turkish-Cypriots to turn to Turkey for help. According to Richmond, “It was in this 
manner,” Richmond criticizes, “that Security Council Resolution 186 set up a series of 
internal and external dynamics that would result in Turkish involvement in Cyprus.”189 
The international community throughout the Cold War was primarily interested in 
preventing escalation of the conflict that could threaten the Cold War equilibrium, not in 
providing a viable solution to the problem. 
(3)  Mediation of UN.  The UN, through mediation and the 
good offices of the Secretary General, has attempted to find a solution to the Cyprus 
problem. Before the Turkish invasion, these efforts focused on the 1960s constitutional 
establishment. After 1974, the Security Council and the General Assembly made frequent 
and veiled references to the continued interference of Turkey, but it continued 
negotiations on the basis of the new reality. The new reality, Richmond notes, had 
created a “balance of sorts between the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot military strength and 
the Greek-Cypriot legality.’”190 This situation enabled the two parties to have different 
expectations of the UN organization, according to Richmond, which together with the 
“obstacles to the peacemaking process of its own making, and its indirect involvement in 
the issues of the dispute, prevented the organization from finding a viable solution.”191 
Numerous direct and indirect UN-sponsored efforts for negotiations have been initiated 
since 1974. Yet, the different perspectives of the two sides have prevented a resolution of 
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the problem.192 In 2004, the last and most hopeful effort by the UN to introduce a 
settlement to the problem, the Anan Plan, was rejected by 75 percent of the Greek 
Cypriots in a referendum.193 Since then, while new efforts at mediation between the two 
sides have been initiated, no positive outcome has yet emerged.  
b. UN and International Law 
The second aspect of the UN involvement in Greek-Turkish relations is 
related to international law. The UN charter declares: “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations.”194 Yet Turkey has said many times that the expansion of 
Greece’s territorial waters to twelve miles would be viewed by Turkey as a casus belli.195 
Turkey’s rationale is that such an event would be a violation of its national interests. 
Turkish officials seem to be suggesting that a country’s national interest overrides its 
obligation to act in a legitimate fashion as part of the international community. Thus, 
Turkey refuses to sign the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
because it is against Turkey’s interests in the Aegean Sea. This view derives from the 
notion that the situation in the Aegean is unique and for this reason should be treated 
differently. Greece, on the other hand, has attempted to use the UN to show that Turkey 
is an international troublemaker and does not respect international law.196 For many 
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years, Greek politicians have focused on the legal status of this bilateral dispute, in which 
Turkey emphasizes the political aspect and the need for bilateral negotiations that will 
include all aspects of the dispute.197  
The International Court of Justice has been used only once in Greek–
Turkish relations. In 1976, Greece unilaterally applied to the court to make a judgment 
about the delimitation of the continental self in the Aegean and requested interim 
measures of protection in the meantime. But the court indicated that it did not have the 
right to make just a judgment since Turkey did not recognize its jurisdiction.198 
Nonetheless, the court recognized that the dispute has a legal basis and can be resolved 
through legal measures.199 Because the International Court of Justice does judge the 
political aspect of a dispute, Greek officials declared that they consider the International 
Court of the Law of Sea as the appropriate institution to judge naval disputes.200 
Greek–Turkish disputes have created a difficult situation for the 
international community. In their creation of the UN, the member states believed that 
they had provided an organization that would promote peace and stability and help solve 
political disputes under a legal umbrella.  
Greece has refused to negotiate with Turkey for many years because it 
thought that doing so would legitimize Turkey’s claims. Turkey, by contrast, refuses to 
do as Greece asks and proceed to the international courts. Turkey believes that by doing  
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so it would lose, since Greece’s argument is more legitimate from a legal standpoint. And 
thus, the Turks suggest that the two states should solve their problems at the negotiation 
table.  
According to the UN Charter, negotiation is one means that states can use 
in their efforts to solve disputes peacefully.201 However, for many years, especially 
during the 1980s, Greece refused to either negotiate with Turkey because Greek officials 
claimed that would legitimize the Turkish claims.202 So Greece continued to seek a 
solution through the UN, since it believed that, as a relatively weak state, that 
organization could better protect Greece’s national interests. 
Nonetheless, in 1999, the Greek view of the dispute with Turkey shifted 
dramatically, and an effort was made by the two states to negotiate their disputes. Some 
have argued that this tactical shift was not, however, an outcome of the influence of the 
UN, but of the European Union. Indeed, the existence of the UN, its principles, and its 
norms, has not so far helped resolve the problem. Rather, its positive influence can be 
seen mostly in the lack of escalation of the conflict and the fact that the procedures of 
negotiation have provided a forum where the two parties could come closer together and 
learn to understand the views of the other.  
In addition, the UN has consistently decided not to implement sanctions 
against Turkey, although that it recognized through resolutions the illegality of the 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The reality that the UN has not succeeded so far in acting 
decisively to solve the issues of dispute between the two states is primarily a result of the 
political concerns of the organization. The balance of international power that the 
Security Council represents has proven to be a decisive factor in the culture of the 
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organization. As a result, Greece has also applied to other organizations, especially the 
European Community, for a more effective institutional system that would promote a 
solution to the Greek–Turkish disputes.  
2. NATO’s Role in the Greek-Turkish Disputes 
During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was 
undoubtedly a safeguard of peace in Western Europe. Yet the role that it has played in 
regional conflicts is more open to question. Some argue that, especially in Greek–Turkish 
disputes, NATO has provided a new venue to air disagreements.  
The NATO accession of Greece and Turkey was a result of U.S. policy.203 The 
Soviet threat that Greece faced in the north from Bulgaria and that Turkey faced on its 
north-eastern and northern borders from the USSR was the main reason that the United 
States supported their NATO membership. Thus, though most of the European members 
were initially against it, in 1952, both states became members of the alliance.204  
Almost immediately, the Cyprus problem erupted, which was the starting point of 
the contemporary Greek–Turkish problems. From a realist perspective, it appears that the 
two states now felt secure from the Soviet threat and shifted their interests from the Cold 
War to national regional strategies. At the time, the constitutional solution that Britain 
had achieved for an independent Cyprus showed little evidence of viability. As a result, 
there was an increase of Greek and Turkish political activity that increased the tension 
between the two states.205  
And the development of those tense conditions threatened in turn the cohesion of 
the alliance. In response, Ronald Krebs acknowledges, the U.S. secretary of state, John 
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Foster Dulles, urged the two states to abandon their current problematic tactics “for the 
sake of coalition” and to adapt “their national objectives to the greater good of the free 
world,” meaning the alliance’s goals.206 Behind these promptings lay a threat that U.S. 
aid would otherwise be terminated. But during the next decade the tension in the island 
did not relax. In 1964, Turkey informed the United States that it intended to invade the 
island. The United States responded strongly, threatening that Turkey would lose the 
protection of NATO if it invaded Cyprus.207 This U.S. reaction in the name of the 
alliance caused Turkey to abandon the planned invasion and thus avoid a potential 
Greek–Turkish war. 
Disputes continued. A coup against the government of Cyprus, promoted by the 
Greek military government, resulted in Turkey’s invasion and the division of the island. 
Many scholars in Greece and the bulk of public opinion blamed the United States and 
NATO for not averting this outcome and for the indirect support of the Greek junta by the 
United States.208 Others believed that NATO had averted an escalation of the conflict and 
prevented a Greek–Turkish war.  
In the years that followed the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the disputes between 
the two states became broader. In 1987, during a crisis about oil exploitation of the 
Aegean, the two states mobilized their military forces. In response, Fotios Moustakis 
writes, permanent NATO “representatives convened an emergency session to call for 
non-resource to force” and suggested that the two nations proceed in negotiations for a 
relaxation of their bilateral disputes.209 An effort was made in 1988 in Davos, 
Switzerland, by the prime ministers of the two states to create a climate of mutual trust, 
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but it failed to last overtime. In 1996, the two states again came close to war during the 
Imia/Kardak crisis, a dyad of disputed islands.210 This time, as the prime minister of 
Greece, Simitis, has pointed out, direct U.S. mediation helped to relax the tension.211 A 
step toward better relations among the two states occurred at the NATO Summit in July 
1997 in Madrid, when “the Greek and Turkish leaders, with the support of the U.S. and 
NATO General Secretary J. Solana, made a pledge to respect each other’s rights and 
avoid the use of force against one another in the future.”212  
Yet, the role of NATO in the bilateral dispute also has a dark side. The alliance 
lacked (and still lacks) the organizational procedures for internal conflict-resolution. 
Additionally, even though NATO prevented some disputes or the escalation of existing 
disputes, it has not succeeded so far in helping to resolve the problems. As a 
consequence, Greek officials believing that NATO had failed to provide useful security 
guaranties, sought alternatives from the European Community and the West European 
Union.213  
The military help that the United States provides to support the southern flank of 
NATO has also been a disputed issue.214 NATO itself also has become a source of 
antagonism between the two states. From 1977 until 1980, Turkey vetoed the Greek 
efforts to reenter the military structure of the alliance, and refused the inclusion of 
specific islands in NATO exercises.215 Greece, in response, boycotted allied military 
exercises in the Aegean.216 
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In sum, NATO has had a multi-faceted role in the Greek-Turkish dispute. It 
provided a forum where Greek and Turkish leaders, officials, and military officers can 
discuss bilateral issues and further their understanding of each other’s views. NATO also 
provided a venue for U.S. officials to dampen existing disputes. NATO’s provision of 
security against the Soviet threat probably allowed the emergence of Greek and Turkish 
national strategies. Krebs concludes that the impact of, the “alliance[’s] arms transfers” 
and the “alliance itself – its forums and its benefits – became an object of contest” and as 
a result broadened the issues under dispute which it lacked the capability to solve.217  
3. European Union and Greek- Turkish Relations 
The European Union is a unique organization. Mark Trachtenberg insists that its 
creation was strongly supported by the United States who saw it as a “third great power 
block” between the United States and the Soviet Union.218 As the Cold War developed, 
U.S. officials saw the threats that had arisen. And, in an effort to safeguard the new world 
status, they promoted closer cooperation among the European states in the belief that that 
would prevent them from fighting each other and would provide a first line of defense 
against the Soviet threat.219 
The failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, Andrew 
Moravcsik argues, “crushed the hopes that the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ESCC) … would lead automatically to deeper integration.”220 Yet, this failure initiated a 
shift in the efforts for European integration toward an integration focused on economics, 
which led to the development of the European Economic Community (EEC). The gradual 
institutional development of the EEC resulted in its transformation within the European 
Community (EC) and, later on, in the European Union. The initial specialized economic 
arrangement was transformed into an organization with the three pillars – economic, 
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political, and judicial – and a common currency, with global influence, and with many 
states striving to enter the “club” that it now represents.221 
Greek-Turkish relations are closely connected with the European Union, since 
Greece is a member of the union and Turkey is a candidate state. Both states sought to 
create ties with the EEC soon after its foundation.  
a. Greece and the EU 
Greece, was the first “third country” to sign the Association Agreement 
with the EEC in 1961, which included a provision for full membership.222 A military 
coup in 1967 froze Greek relations with the European Community until 1974 when 
democracy was reestablished. The following year Greece applied for full membership. 
Ioakimidis notes that there were four main reasons for Greece’s application,  
1. To stabilize its democracy through the European institutional framework 
2. To strengthen its independence and security in the region and in the 
international system, especially against Turkey after its invasion of 
Cyprus. Greece also sought to relax its dependence on the United States. 
3. To develop and modernize the Greek economy  
4. To contribute to the European integration process.223 
Initially, the European Commission’s suggestion was that Greece should 
have a pre-accession status. Yet, the fear of political instability in Greece allowed 
negotiations for full membership to begin in 1976. They ended three years later with 
Greece as the tenth member of the EEC.224 
The new socialistic government of Greece that took power in 1981 
initially developed a negative policy against further European integration. Yet, between 
1985 and 1995, Greece shifted that policy as it reevaluated the positive economic and 
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political benefits of the European Community. Greece realized that following a negative 
policy would marginalize it in relation to future European developments. Thus, Greece 
supported further political integration and a broadening of the sectors in which the 
European Community is involved.  But Greece’s national policy did not parallel the 
policies that the other members of the European Community were following. Greek 
policies, especially against the dissolution of Yugoslavia, proved to be more nationalistic 
and less realistic, which led the country’s marginalization by the other European Union 
members.225 
1996 was a turning point in Greece in relation to the European 
Community. The new socialistic government of Kostas Simitis initiated a new era, which 
can be characterized as an era of emancipation of Greece in Europe. The reformist plan 
that developed had as a goal the modernization of the Greek economy and the 
enhancement of its institutional status in the European Community. This goal also 
required the modernization of Greek foreign policy. The successful participation of 
Greece in the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2002, together with the other 
members of the European Union, was a decisive factor. Greece became a part of the 
“hard core” of the Union.226 
The most surprising change in Greece’s policies was the shift in favor of 
Turkey’s candidacy in the European Union at the 1999 meeting in Helsinki. Greece 
realized that the “veto policy” that it had adopted opposing Turkey’s relations with the 
European Union did not support Greece’s national interests and only preserved the 
tension between the two states. The realist approach of zero-sum gains that had been 
followed for about five decades intensified the mistrust between them and reinforced the 
negative perceptions that Turks had of Greece.  
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The new policy toward Turkey sought to bind it to a process of 
Europeanization that Greece believed (and still believes) would support Greek 
interests.227 Greek officials  convinced that the Europeanization (democratization) of the 
political, social, and economic system of Turkey will diminish Turkey’s aggressive 
policy toward Greece.228 
b. Turkey and the EU 
Turkey’s relations with the European Union  can be traced the founder of 
modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal. Kemal’s views about Turkey’s future were based on a 
European-style of modernity. In 1963, Turkey signed an Association Agreement with the 
EEC which included a provision for full membership in the future. That agreement, 
together with an Additional Protocol signed in 1970, were the basis for future economic 
and trade relations between the European Community and Turkey, whose goal was a 
Customs Union between the EEC and Turkey with an anticipated time frame between 
1980 and 1995.229 
Political and economic issues during the 1970s and early 1980s, however,  
prevented further progress in Turkey’s relations with the European Community. The 
current protectionist strategy and economic crisis in Turkey in 1977, together with a 
military coup in 1980, slowed down the process. During this period, Stephen Larrabe and 
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Ian O. Lesser  argue, Ankara oriented “its policy more toward Washington than Brussels” 
while, in the mean time, the “EC’s goals and competence expanded significantly.”230  
Turkey regenerated its interest in the EC during the 1980s and in 1987 
applied for membership. The application was finally rejected in 1989, because Turkey 
emphasized only the economic spectrum of the EC without recognizing the shift of its 
interest to political issues.231 Yet EC–Turkey relations gradually improved, and in 1995 a 
Customs Union Agreement was finally signed.  
During the last years of the twentieth century, the relations between the 
EC and Turkey became tense. At the Luxemburg Summit in 1997 the EC refused to give 
Turkey the status of a candidate state, which it provided to a number of states in Central 
Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, proving once again that political motivations were 
decisive for the Community.232 This outcome outraged the Turkish political elites who 
declared that from that time on Turkey would refuse to have a political dialogue with the 
European Union.233 Yet in 1999, in Helsinki, the European Union did finally recognize 
Turkey as a candidate state.  
The membership criteria of the European Union, known as the 
Copenhagen Criteria, required Turkey to meet the same conditions as the rest of the 
candidate states. They were established at the European Union summit of 1993. In 
addition to the economic aspects of the criteria, the political requirements mandated that 
candidate states achieve a stable democracy, maintain the rule of law, guarantee human 
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rights, and protect minorities.234 Since then, they have added criteria that suggest that 
Turkey should resolve her differences with Greece and that both states should proceed to 
a settlement in Cyprus.235 In December 2004, the European Council decided to open 
accession negotiations with Turkey.236 
c. The EU Role in Greek-Turkish Relations 
The role of the EU in Greek-Turkish relations occurs at two governmental 
levels. First, the European Union has a direct affect on Greek-Turkish relations and the 
balance of power between the two countries. The most obvious achievement leveling this 
regard was Greece’s accession to membership in the European Union before Turkey. 
Greece’s accession early in the 1980s resulted in the transfer of significant funds to 
Greece. These funds helped Greece to keep up in its arms race with Turkey, at least until 
the mid 1990s, without burdening significantly its own economy. Yet, the economic 
obligations that also arose from its membership in the European Union proved that the 
arms race was at a deadlock. But it did provide Greece, as a member of the Community, 
with extra diplomatic power, which it used against Turkey. Greece’s diplomatic power 
thus counterbalanced Turkey’s military strength.  
Until the late twentieth century Greece followed a foreign policy against 
Turkey that was based in a zero-sum gain. Greece’s use of the veto in the European 
Union proved to be a powerful tool which led to the recognition of Cyprus as a candidate  
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state in 1995. After that success, Greece lifted its veto against the Turkish Customs 
Union.237 This was a tremendous achievement, since today Cyprus is a member of the 
EU while Turkey is still involved in the accession process.  
The Helsinki decision also had a direct affect on the relations between the 
two states. Exploratory talks between the two states had begun in 2002 to find a solution 
to their disputes.238 This began an era of détente which resulted in a state of 
rapprochement. Turkey declared it had no territorial claims against Greece.239 The 
Cyprus problem also seemed to enter a new phase in which Turkey became more 
conciliatory. 
Yet, the exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey about the Aegean 
never reached a final common conclusion. The so-called UN Anan plan, which proposed 
a resolution of the Cyprus problem, was rejected by the Greek-Cypriots in a referendum. 
And the island remains divided today. The direct binding capability of the European 
Union was apparently weak, since Turkey received accession status in 2004 without 
either the Greek-Turkish problems having been resolved or a judgment having been 
reached at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.  
Nevertheless, the indirect affect that European Union has had on Greece 
and Turkey is a factor that receives strong support. The Europeanization process, which 
the two states have begun, is believed by many scholars and politicians to be a decisive 
procedure that will ease the tension between them.240 About the term, Europeanization, 
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scholars have varying opinions. They do agree, however, that the term is not just about 
transforming their economic structures and participation in the different institutions of the 
Union.  
Europeanization is a process that affects the basic political, social, and 
economic structure of states. The European Union represents a broad spectrum of norms 
and believes that the adoption of these norms will not only gradually became common to 
the member states, but also will influence the candidate states. Democratic principles, a 
respect for human rights, and the rule of law become the culture not only of the elites but 
also of common citizens. These factors effect the abolition of the use of force among the 
member states.241 
The evolution of the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy lasted about 
two decades. Greece’s shift to a more realistic policy against Turkey began in 1995, but 
the real shift happened in 1999. Since then, Greek officials have steadily promoted the 
European prospects of Turkey, because they believe that process will produce a more 
democratic state. Through democratization and the development of Turkey’s economy, 
they believe that the Turkish society, both its elite and its grass roots, will shift gradually 
to a more Westernized liberal culture.  
Since 1999, many political, economic, and social reforms have been 
adopted by Turkey. But, as the example of Greece has shown, the procedure of 
Europeanization takes time. The European Commission’s 2006 evaluation of Turkey’s 
progress revealed a number of issues that require further improvement.242  
Since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Greek-Turkish relations have been on 
a different path. Although no obvious, significant change has occurred in regard to the 
issues of dispute, the two states have developed a network of contacts between  
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governmental officials, businessmen, and NGOs. Even the rhetoric that both states use is 
less aggressive than in the past, something that could not have been achieved without the 
European Union’s influence. 
A dramatic increase of international inter-governmental organizations 
occurred during the twentieth century. As the world changed, so did states’ willingness to 
cooperate and coordinate their relations. Yet the organizational structure of International 
Governmental Organizations influences their effectiveness. This structure reflects 
specific views about the nature of international relations. The UN and NATO have been 
the projects of a realist point of view. This is why their fundamental organizational 
structure has not changed, although especially after the fall of communism they have 
tried to represent a broader, deeper spectrum of politics. The European Union, however, 
is based on a different school of thought, one that arose through the disaster of World 
War II. The paths that it follows strive to make a change. The continuous, yet difficult 
procedure of transformation from an economic community to a political union has 
affected not only its member states but also the candidate states. The European Union 
demands but also creates specific political behaviors.  
Greek-Turkish relations have been influenced by International 
Governmental Organizations. NATO and the UN had mostly a stabilizing effect in 
specific crises, rather than promoting cultures of peace. They also have not effectively 
promoted international law. In contrast, the European Union, through the criteria for 
membership it has developed, seems to have a more persuasive role. The economic 
benefits and the democratic norms that the European Union represents are decisive 
factors in the Europeanization process. Greece has changed its absolute policies of the 
past in foreign affairs. Turkey also has been more skeptical in the way it promotes its 
claims in the Aegean, since respect for international law is a prerequisite for membership. 
International Governmental Organizations have had a positive effect on 
Greek-Turkish relations. Both states have benefited, or expect to benefit, from their 
membership, especially when the International Governmental Organizations have the 
ability to transform the political culture. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A state at peace is a noble achievement. One has only to consider the marvel of 
the channel tunnel between the frontiers of such former mortal enemies as Britain and 
France to see the truth of this assertion.  Yet, history shows that humans habitually fail to 
act in a noble way, often resorting to disastrous wars. The philosopher, Immanuel Kant, 
wrote his treatise, Perpetual Peace, to illustrate how peace could be better promoted 
among states. The philosophical background of Kant’s theory has a clear and emphatic 
moral dimension. According to Kant’s liberal ideas, the development of democracy, 
economic interdependence, and international organizations and international law will not 
only contribute to a more peaceful world, but also may serve as a theological approach in 
international relations. It might also be argued, however, that Kant’s theory is more a 
wish than an explanation of states’ behavior. 
The realist school of thought rejects Kant’s theory and suggests that, among 
states, a balance of power must be maintained to guarantee state survival. More 
specifically, realists suggest that economic interdependence is often a factor in disputes 
because it increases states’ vulnerability to potential opponents and serves as a source of 
disputes. Moreover, international organizations and international law, realists argue, are 
the creations of strong states in an effort to preserve the balance of power, they are not 
independent forces in world politics. 
Other theories, which have developed recently and are situated theoretically 
between those two, attempt to explain international behavior and the effects of economic 
interdependence and international governmental organizations. 
This thesis asks the basic question: Have the three elements of Kantian peace had 
a positive influence on Greek-Turkish relations? Greek-Turkish relations have been 
characterized by a history-based enmity, which increased during the second half of the 
twentieth century because of a clash between their national interests and goals. As a 
result, both countries’ populations and political elites came to mistrust the other and are 
characterized by a generally negative opinion of their counterparts in the other state. 
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These notions and feelings were decisive factors in the bilateral relations between 
Greece and Turkey. In almost every decade of the last fifty years, a crisis erupted and 
threatened to conclude in war. Relatively recently, since 1999, a rapprochement has 
created hopes that there is a possibility of a peaceful resolution of their disputes. This 
thesis examines these historical developments in the context of Kant’s three elements. 
During the post–WWII era, the domestic politics of both Greece and Turkey were 
turbulent with the struggle for democracy beclouded by the legacy of the 19th century, the 
cold war, and civil-military conflict. Moreover, in this same period, various issues of 
dispute emerged which were based in the respective, conflicted national interests. 
Although the two states had official democratic political systems, they were not 
sufficiently mature and stable. As Rusett shows, the possibility of war between two states 
is higher when one has a non-democratic system. Moreover, there is a higher possibility 
of war among democracies when one is less stable than the others.  In 1974, when an 
armed conflict, though not a war, occurred on Cyprus, Greece had a military regime. But, 
after the fall of the junta, the new democratic government avoided aggressive policies, a 
political decision that supports Kant’s theory of democratic peace.  
The fact that the emancipation of the Greek democratic system lasted about two 
decades after the fall of the junta, in contrast to the Turkish political system’s lack of 
stability and the institutions of a Western-style democracy, raises questions about the 
ability of its contemporary political system to contribute to more peaceful bilateral 
relations with Greece.  
An unstable democratic political system, in which political partition is a dominant 
condition, may be influenced negatively by the nationalistic feelings of its populace. In 
such cases, the political parties may become hostages of public opinion which in turn are 
manipulated by the parties in an effort to support their political survival. Such were the 
conditions that existed during most of the crises that emerged between Greece and 
Turkey. 
A country’s economic conditions and development also may be issues that 
influence its international relations. During the post–WWII era, Greece and Turkey had 
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not yet developed specific economic ties. Yet, the oil crises of the 1970s became catalysts 
in the deterioration of their bilateral relations. The realist-based notions that dominated 
their policies until the end of the century escalated the intensity of the dispute, as the 
exploitation of the Aegean Sea became the main basis of conflict. 
Since 1999, however, the decision of Greek and Turkish officials to promote 
issues of “low politics” has resulted in a gradual expansion of economic ties between the 
two states. While the economic numbers of this new development have not yet reached 
hoped for levels, there is now interdependence (resulting in some cases sensitivity and in 
some cases vulnerability) between Greece and Turkey. And the continuous year-by-year 
increase in trade between them shows that there is a decided trend toward continued 
interdependence. The states’ private sectors also now seek to exploit the benefits of 
economic cooperation. For this goal to be reached, however, more relaxed bilateral 
relations are necessary. As a consequence, leaders of the economic circles of both states 
began to ask their governments to separate their national policies from the economic 
policies. The higher the numbers of the economic ties go, the most probable that those 
voices calling for bilateral relaxation will be heard. 
Another requirement for economic development is internal political stability. 
Some economic factions in Turkey voiced their demands for a relaxation of the political 
tension in spring 2007, during the election campaign for the presidency. This shows that 
the economy may indeed be a factor that influences domestic politics toward stability, 
which may in turn affect international politics.243 
International inter-governmental organizations also have a role in international 
relations. Yet, as this thesis has shown, not all international governmental organizations 
have the same level of influence.  
The UN is a product of a “realist” world, since its structure supports the balance 
of power of the post–WWII era. In regard to Greek-Turkish relations, it did not succeed 
in promoting peace between the two countries. Nor did its peace operations in Cyprus 
succeed in preventing the 1974 armed conflict. And so far, its mediation has not achieved 
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a positive outcome that could lead to the resolution of the political problem. Moreover, 
the UN resolutions, which are supposed to be based on international law, have failed to 
bring a change. Since none of the sanctions addressed Greece and Turkey, they continue 
to interpret international law in ways favorable to their own national interests.  
NATO is also a product of a “realist” world. Its foundation occurred during the 
confrontation between East and West of the Cold War. NATO might have even helped 
the emergence of confrontation between Greece and Turkey. Both states, feeling secure 
under the alliance’s umbrella, shifted their interests to more regional issues. And the 
modernization of their military capabilities supported their hostile policies. 
Granted that NATO focused on the Soviet threat, it lacked a dedicated 
organizational structure for the prevention or resolution of internal conflicts. Also, the 
policies adopted by the alliance sought to protect its cohesion, regardless of the political 
systems of its members. Such policy further reflected British and U.S. statecraft in the 
eastern Mediterranean in the period from the 1950s until the 1990s. What is worse, 
NATO became just another venue for the confrontation between Greece and Turkey. 
In contrast to the UN and NATO, the European Union had a more dynamic effect 
on Greek-Turkish relations. What differentiated the European Union was its continuous 
transformation. From an economic community it has become a supranational political 
union that influences states at many different levels of the national policies. The 
economic liberalization that the European Union demands has as a prerequisite the 
elimination of state interference. This has resulted in the liberalization of state institutions 
and norms which, in effect, supports economic cooperation and interdependence.  
Other prerequisites of European Union membership are that candidate states have 
internal stability, meaning they are stable democracies, and that they promote regional 
stability. Thus, immediately after the fall of the junta, when it was striving to enter the 
European Economic Community, Greece tried to lessen its aggressive profile in its 
disputes with Turkey. Instead of confronting Turkey as the political opposition demanded 
during the crisis of 1976, the Greek government sought a solution through the UN.  
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The marginalization that Greece faced in the European Union during the 1980s 
and early 1990s was due to its absolutist policy, which was based on a “realist” view of 
international relations. Greece even treated the prospect of Turkish membership as a tool 
to pressure Turkey. Yet, Greece did not use its veto power against the procedure for 
Turkey’s candidacy, even though Turkey had not accomplished the criteria proposed at 
the Helsinki summit. Greece expects that the continuous progress of Europeanization in 
Turkey will have a positive spill-over effect resulting in more relaxed bilateral relations. 
The Europeanization of candidate and member states has been a positive 
procedure, but not an immediate one. During the last three decades, this procedure has 
helped Greece transform politically, economically, and even culturally. The same affect 
is expected in Turkey. It began in 1999 when Turkey was accepted as a candidate state. 
In sum, the author of this study argues that the three elements of Kantian peace 
have had a positive effect on Greek-Turkish relations. Yet Kantian peace is an ideal 
condition in which states behave according to liberal beliefs. For years, Greece and 
Turkey followed realist policies, confronting one another via a Machtpolitik that 
harkened back to the early 20th century. To create a better relationship these nation-states 
must believe in, and follow, liberal ideals. The most influential factor in such political 
behavior and culture seems to be the European Union, which promotes directly and 
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